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A Journal of Opinion

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Lend-Lease and Its Sequel

The sudden termination of Lend-Lease came as a shock to the British. The official explanation in Washington that it had always been understood that Lend-Lease would continue only for the duration of the war, and that Congress had left the President no choice, does not explain. For the date of the termination of the war can be adjusted within extremely elastic limits. Officially, and for the purpose of much emergency legislation, it will not come without a formal proclamation by the President or a congressional resolution, which may be delayed many months. There may be several definitions of the termination of hostilities or the end of the war.

The British themselves do not want Lend-Lease to continue indefinitely. They want to stand on their own feet as soon as possible, even more eagerly than we want them to do so. But in order to be independent of aid they must restore and enlarge their exports, and they cannot make much progress in this until reconversion is well along. In the meantime they must have food and materials. Washington asserts there will be no difficulty in obtaining them on credit. But the British are also reluctant to borrow and so to increase their foreign indebtedness. They are especially resolved not to do so if the loans from America in any way compromise their freedom of choice in domestic or foreign economic policy. Many statements in this country sound to them as if we expect to make such conditions. In other words, they fear that we intend to use their necessity—a result of their onerous part in the joint war—to compromise their autonomy.

Can the Mistake Be Retrieved?

It would have contributed much to Anglo-American amity if these questions could have been explored and a solution reached before the date for the termination of Lend-Lease was set. That date could then have been announced jointly. (Although the funds and legislation were provided by Congress, Lend-Lease was an international agreement in which both sides had their part to play, not merely a one-sided grant.) The Administration has, we believe, made a serious error of judgment in not following such a course. At the very least, the termination should not have come until Bretton Woods was ratified, the International Bank had been set up, and our Export-Import Bank had been provided with ample funds. For it is institutions such as these which were planned to provide the transition.

It may be that the situation may be retrieved by the British economic mission now on its way to the United States and the conferences to follow. If it is to be retrieved, the American negotiators must remember that we cannot bind the British to "free enterprise" either at home or abroad merely by offering them money. A more fundamental understanding than this is necessary. Use of relief for political purposes is banned by all decent men and states. Attempting to do so with so proud a people as the British would surely incur their eternal enmity.

The Soviet-Chinese Treaty

As usual, Russia has in the new treaty with China disappointed the anti-Soviet extremists, who had been predicting that she would annex Manchuria and Korea

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and would back the Communists in a Chinese civil war. Instead, she asks nothing in Korea and admits Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, regaining only Port Arthur, an equal share in the Manchurian railways and a free port in Dairen. She explicitly renounces support of the Chinese Communists and any meddling in Chinese internal affairs. Outer Mongolia is to become independent if the inhabitants vote for independence—as they undoubtedly will. While this region will remain under Soviet influence, Sinkiang unquestionably will be assigned to China. There remains no danger of a clash of American or British interests with Russian "imperialism" in the Far East. So another hobgoblin is banished.

What About China?

It was always out of the question that the Soviet Union would court a conflict with the Western Allies by backing Yenan while they supported Chungking. Its realistic policy, as before, seeks national security and economic requirements rather than romantic revolutionary adventure. Chungking is taking advantage of the agreement by seeking to bring the Communists under its control. Many on the Left will regard this outcome as a "selling out" of Chinese progressive democracy by cynical Soviet power politics. Whatever the Russian motives, however, the main strength of the Yenan government rests, as it has for the duration of the war, not on Soviet help but on support by the people where it rules. No arbitrary solution of the conflict can be permanent. Chungking itself must be democratized if China is to become a modern industrial state which can be relied upon as a responsible member of the Big Five. Above all, the United States must not become responsible for supplying to Chungking the moral and material support to crush by force those who demand a democratic policy. Our intervention on one side would be even more reprehensible than Russia's on the other.

Bishop in the St. Louis Star-Times

The Steep But Hopeful Way Back

Mr. Bevin on Foreign Policy

Mr. Bevin's first speech as Foreign Minister in the new Labor government left most American liberals gasping with dismay. Press dispatches noted that it was cheered more by the Conservatives than by Labor, and that Mr. Eden promptly announced he could find nothing in it with which to disagree. Mr. Bevin seemed to reiterate the Tory demand for Hong Kong. He repudiated any armed intervention in Spain. He wants the present Greek government to remain in power for the present. He bluntly demanded a democratic policy in Eastern Europe.

The first thing to note about the speech is that American liberals should have known better than to expect anything very different from Mr. Bevin. He represents the Old Guard in the Labor Party. Despite Mr. Eden's words of praise, however, there are differences between Labor's foreign policy and that of the Tories, even when at a given moment they say the same words. In regard to Spain, for example, it is quite true that armed intervention from abroad would do more harm than good. The Spanish Republicans don't want it, and have said so. Whereas Churchill apparently sees no reason why Franco should not stay indefinitely, British labor may well be working behind the scenes to get rid of him. Now that Mr. Truman has spoken out bluntly against him, and a Republican Government-in-Exile has been formed, Dictator Franco is certainly less secure than he has ever been in the past.

The Tendency of the Labor Party

Again, as to Greece, Mr. Bevin's statement is good or bad depending upon how soon the promised election or plebiscite takes place. If it is coming in the very near future, there might be some sense in retaining the present government a little longer. Here, again, the Labor Party is entitled, for the present, to the benefit of the doubt.

As we point out in another column, Great Britain and the United States are quite correct in insisting on democratic processes in Eastern Europe; it is a question of emphasis. We can stand up for our beliefs without indicating hostility to Russia and without in any way endangering the United Nations or the peace settlements.

As for Hong Kong, Mr. Bevin may have had in mind establishing British sovereignty only as a preliminary to restoring it to China, with appropriate guarantees of British economic interests. As an important port, it is properly a part of the Chinese Republic, and Chinese opinion would bitterly resent its continuance as a British crown colony. Nevertheless, it is also

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a key point in British Far Eastern trade, and the Empire plays an important part in all plans for British economic security, now threatened by a deficit in foreign exchange. These considerations influence Labor planners as well as Conservatives. Some amicable adjustment of these conflicting interests is a necessity. And Mr. Bevin did refer to Chinese consent.

It should be remembered in all such issues that most of the Labor representatives in Parliament are young and untrammeled. They will not endure a continuance of Tory policy either at home or abroad. When their leaders use words capable of two interpretations, the emphasis will be on the Left. If the old leaders do not move fast or far enough, they will be required to do so in order to retain their power.

Spanish Government-in-Exile

After six years of wrangling and bickering, Spanish Republican parties and factions have at last succeeded in forming a government-in-exile. This is good news to all those who have felt for years that the establishment of a widely representative democratic government was the only alternative to the fascist Franco regime. The government is headed by Sr. José Giral, an outstanding political figure in Republican Spain whose liberalism is beyond reproach. The government includes such well known democratic politicians as Fernando de los Rios, the former Ambassador to Washington; Alvaro de Albornoz, of the Republican Left; Indalecio Prieto, the former Minister of War; and a number of others representing various regional parties. Although invited to join, Dr. Juan Negrín, the last Republican Prime Minister, is not included. The reason given is that his membership was held up by his own Socialist Party. This is unfortunate because Sr. Negrín enjoys abroad a prestige probably greater than that of any of the cabinet members. Also excluded are Communist representatives. They were invited, but refused to join, probably because of their long-standing quarrel with Sr. Prieto. In view of the large following they are reported to have in Spain, their participation would have immeasurably strengthened the new government. It is to be hoped that the government will be able to work out a platform to which the Communists and other dissident groups can adhere, so that the Spanish Republicans in exile can present both to Franco and the world a really united Republican front.

State Department and Argentina

The resignation of Nelson A. Rockefeller as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America and the appointment as his successor of Spruille Braden presages a stiffening of our attitude toward the fascist government of Argentina. Just as Mr. Rockefeller had become the symbol of United States appeasement with respect to Argentina, Mr. Braden as ambassador to that country gradually became the symbol of American disapproval. It is unfortunate that Mr. Rockefeller's resignation was not accepted last April when he first tendered it, before he had the chance of being instrumental in the admission of Argentina to the United Nations Organization. He had, of course, the blessing of the administration at that time. But to judge from Secretary Byrnes's statement announcing Mr. Braden's promotion, it appears that our policy has changed since then. Mr. Braden, Byrnes asserted, was appointed Assistant Secretary because "of his accurate interpretation of the policies of this government in its relations with the present government of the Argentine." And it will be his duty, Byrnes continued, "to see that the policies which he has so courageously sponsored in the Argentine are continued with unremitting vigor." We are anxiously looking forward to a bill of particulars which would do the job of translating this general policy into fact.

Industry-Labor Conference

The CIO, the AFL, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the National Association of Manufacturers have agreed to participate in a labor-management conference on postwar problems under government sponsorship. The chief executives of the four organizations met with President Truman last week and accepted his suggestion of such a conference. Secretary of Labor Schwellenbach will confer with Secretary of Commerce Wallace and leaders of other labor and management groups within the next few days on plans for the meeting and will call a preliminary conference on September 5 to draft an agenda and decide on details of time and place.

President Truman's primary hope is that this conference will produce some formula to prevent industrial strife to take the place of the no-strike, no-lockout wartime pledges agreed to at a similar labor-management meeting called by President Roosevelt just after Pearl Harbor. We hope that the coming conference will go farther than that and work out an understanding on the necessity for full employment and how it is to be attained, and devise a common plan for new jobs or restored take-home pay for war workers already laid off or undergoing wage cuts.

Economic Idiocy in the Press

The New York *Herald Tribune* writes in its leading editorial of August 23, "Most persons who have given serious study to the so-called full-employment bill . . . are convinced that its potentialities for harm are decidedly greater than those for good." This statement is probably untrue, and certainly is incapable of proof. The editorial goes on to argue that since the bill is designed, not to deal with emergency reconversion but with the long-term problem of unemployment, it should not be considered now. This is typical of the

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imprudent attitude of American conservatives toward economic planning.

When the crisis of reconversion is passed, we shall immediately be confronted with the long-term problem. That may be within a year. Even the attainment of full employment in the near future will depend largely on the confidence which people as purchasers of consumers' goods and investors in new equipment have in the future of employment. The British government's pledge to maintain high employment was made while the war in Europe was still to be won. We shall never be prepared to prevent unemployment unless we begin far ahead of time to clarify our policies and arrange our administrative machinery. Would the *Herald Tribune* make a similar statement about the far simpler problem of military preparedness?

Incidentally, the editorial writer declares that the general theory of the bill recommends "a program of government investment to make up any gap that may be indicated" by estimates of private investment. That proves that he is not one of those who have given the bill serious study. The bill leaves the field open for any remedial proposal, including tax reduction, stimulation of private investment, anti-monopoly action, or anti-inflation measures if the prospect of total spending should be too large.

We pick out this editorial, not as a horrible example, since the *Herald Tribune's* editorial page is in many respects one of the best written and most intelligent in the country. Writers of newspaper editorials on economic subjects are, with a few honorable exceptions, troglodytic in their information and attitude. We cannot even bear to mention the ridiculous economic dissertations on the editorial page of the *Herald Tribune's* chief rival—the New York *Times*.

Happy Ending in State

Early in June of this year the press came up with a flamboyant story which suggested, in the headlines at least, a spy conspiracy involving two State Department employees, two New York editors, a naval lieutenant and a free-lance writer. As the *New Republic*, among others, was quick to point out, the charges were less serious than the headlines suggested and the whole affair smelled like a State Department effort to silence critics of its generally reactionary policy in the Far East. On August 10 a Federal Grand Jury cleared completely three of the alleged conspirators: Miss Kate Mitchell, co-editor of *Amerasia;* Mark J. Gayn, a regular contributor to a number of magazines on Far Eastern affairs and John S. Service, a State Department officer. Now James F. Byrnes, the new Secretary of State, and the former Undersecretary, Joseph C. Grew, have publicly congratulated Mr. Service on his vindication and he has been returned to active duty in the Department. It is to be hoped that Mr. Service's reinstatement will be the signal for the Department's acceptance of the views that he is widely believed to hold with regard to policy in China and Japan—views that are directly at variance with those which have hitherto influenced our political activity in Asia.

Congress Still Delays

Despite the President's call for Congress to reconvene September 5, few congressional committees are yet at work preparing for the opening of the session. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee has completed one week of very instructive and constructive hearings on the full-employment bill and plans to continue them. The House is asleep on this vital bill. Only a day or so ago, the Senate Finance Committee began its hearings on the urgent question of extending unemployment compensation. Chairman Doughton (D., N. C.) is so opposed to federal unemployment insurance that he has not yet allowed his House Ways and Means Committee even to decide what it will do about President Truman's request for such legislation. Senator Barkley predicts that the Senate bill will be ready for action when that body gathers and will be passed regardless of what the House does.

Both Senate and House Committees are far behind in work on government reorganization, extension of social-security coverage and revision of the Surplus Property Act, all included on the President's list of priority legislation. We hope that citizens all over the country will make it their business to communicate their concern over our unpreparedness for peace to their representatives while they are still at home so that all lethargy will disappear from Capitol Hill with the return of the full body.

What Future for Japan?

BY THE TIME this issue of the *New Republic* reaches its readers, or shortly thereafter, Japan's formal surrender will be complete, the documents signed, MacArthur in Tokyo and the Allied Army of Occupation debarking. We must now, therefore, face the question which thus far we have been dodging: What sort of treatment do we intend to give Japan? And what sort of government?

The argument in favor of continuing Hirohito on the throne was that it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, for anyone else to bring the war to a close. If we had deposed him, it was said, fanatical resistance would have continued among Japanese soldiers and civilians everywhere, costing many thousands of additional lives of Allied soldiers. Just how much there was to this argument, we shall probably never know. On the whole, there was less resistance after the surrender than many Americans expected. Hari-kiri among military leaders and high officials has been markedly rare. We

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are told that "large numbers" of common people have gone out near the Imperial palace grounds in Tokyo and killed themselves; but these statements come from the Tokyo radio, which has always been completely unreliable. Every Japanese is in a mood, of course, to exaggerate the number of incidents of this kind, in an effort to put the victorious Allies at a moral disadvantage.

We might grant, however, for the sake of argument, that retaining the Emperor in order to bring about the surrender was a good idea. The question still remains, What do we do now? The acceptance of the Japanese surrender made by the American Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, made no promise to keep the Emperor permanently on the throne. He said that "from the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. . . . The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." As T. A. Bisson pointed out in last week's *New Republic*, it is not too late to rectify whatever mistakes have already been made, though it soon will be. Japan's future lies in our hands and we begin with a clear slate. What is the wisest use that can be made of our opportunity, in the interest of the Japanese people and those of the world?

One thing to note is that Hirohito is certainly a war criminal, in every technical as well as moral sense. His apologists in this country, like the recent Undersecretary of State, Mr. Grew, have a serious ambivalence in what they say about him. When it comes to making peace, he is so powerful that nobody else could do the job. When it comes to making war, with all the innumerable cruelties, barbarities and violations of the Geneva Convention of which Japan has been guilty, Hirohito becomes the helpless slave of the militarists, so weak that he can be blamed for nothing. Well, you cannot have it both ways. The events of the past fortnight have shown that Hirohito is in fact, and personally, of substantial importance in the Japanese government. This being the case, we do not see why he should not accept his fair share of the responsibility for the war crimes in which he participated. As Mr. Bisson says, an effort is being made to whitewash Hirohito with the argument that he had "bad advisers." These bad advisers, it turns out, were exclusively the military men, and not the great industrialists, the leading Japanese families, the financiers and bankers who in fact stood behind the militarists, profited from the expansion of the Empire—and will do it again if they get the chance.

All sensible people recognize that the Japanese problem is a difficult one. Undoubtedly the religious position of Hirohito makes him important to millions of Japanese—though their allegiance would be turned immediately to anyone else who took his place. It is true that the Japanese people cannot go in one jump from feudal subservience to democratic citizenship. But eventually they can do so; and the sooner they are started on the right path, the sooner the objective will be attained. The question is whether, by our future policy, we shall help the Japanese people to go in that direction, or in another. Italy is perhaps a fair analogue.

When southern Italy was liberated, we talked in generous terms of what we would do to help set the Italian people on the democratic path; but our actions all pointed toward the maintenance of an obnoxious royal family which had connived at the crimes of fascism just as Hirohito connived at Japanese barbarities. Even with Churchill out of office, there are strong elements among the Allied leadership, and especially that of the United States, which would like to appease the dominant, wealthy industrialists and bankers of Japan. They don't want a democratic revolution in that country any more than they do anywhere else. They would not be satisfied to have the Emperor reduced to a position as religious leader only. They want Japan to remain a conservative country as another of those "bulwarks against bolshevism" which they are forever setting up, and which are forever falling of their own weight. If these gentlemen have their way, then the war will indeed have been fought, in large degree, in vain. And the time for us to retrieve ourselves, and to mark a clear and democratic path for the masses of the Japanese, is growing perilously short.

Toward a New Europe

WHAT WILL the world be like, now that we no longer have to fear the Nazi and Japanese aggressors? We shall have to take a new look at it. Our efforts have for so long been concentrated on the fight against them that almost involuntarily we tend to go on repeating the motions appropriate to a world in war against deadly enemies. Yet new vistas have opened; new opportunities and necessities have made their appearance. Opinions will have to be reviewed; policies need adjustment.

Nowhere is this revaluation more pertinent than in thinking of the future of Europe. Before the war and during most of its course the shadows of Hitler and Mussolini darkened all prospects. Native fascism threatened in every corner of the continent. British Conservatives were securely in power; they helped bring on the war by their fear of Russia and their appeasement of Nazism. No imperative was stronger than that the forces of the Left and Center should cement a defensive alliance against this menace—Com-

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munists, Socialists, liberal democrats. They did not do so until forced to the brink of disaster. Eventually the danger of national extinction brought even conservatives into the coalition. Anyone who emphasized differences among either the Allies or their domestic parties was playing the game of the arch enemy of them all.

Now that enemy is gone. European conservatives who collaborated with him are discredited and their power has received a fatal blow. Britain has placed a Socialist government in power with an overwhelming majority and a firm mandate. The future of Europe lies in the hands of the democratic Left. It is no longer possible to decide all questions by the necessity of resisting the assault of reactionaries.

Of course the peace of the world still depends on friendship and collaboration among Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. Within the several European countries, embittered conflict among the forces of the Left would darken all hopes. Compromises and devices of collaboration are still required. Enemies of progress in both the political and the economic spheres still exist, and are busy trying to drive a disastrous wedge between Russia and the Western powers. There can be no toleration for those who foment this hostility and point to future war. But if there are differences of outlook and policy on the Left—and there are important ones—they need no longer be suspended in a compulsory unity. They will be frankly recognized, discussion will develop them, and they must be decided by the methods of democracy and amicable negotiations.

The allusions to Europe in Ernest Bevin's speech on foreign policy brought this new situation into prominence. His reference to lack of democratic safeguards in Bulgaria was interpreted by many as a deplorable attack on the foreign policy of Russia, inspired by the same spirit and accompanied by the same danger as any similar statement by Churchill. Whatever the factual justification for Bevin's attitude in this instance, it is a great mistake to interpret it as a piece of Tory anti-Sovietism. British Socialists, like Socialists on the Continent, are sincere believers in democratic processes and personal liberties. They have fought for them at home and abroad, and they do not intend to sacrifice them in the process of establishing a socialist order. If Communist influence attempts to deny them in Europe, British Laborites will oppose it frankly. Such opposition implies no animosity toward the USSR and no plot against Russian security. It is in no sense collaboration with a moribund fascism or with reactionary economic or political interests, which socialism also sturdily opposes.

The European peoples are about to reconstruct their institutions in the form of a new order. They have a dominant socialist orientation. The prestige of Russia has been and still is strong among them. If the choice had remained one between Nazism and communism or even one between conservatively led capitalism and communism they would ultimately have chosen communism. But Soviet policy does not now seek to plunge them into communist revolution, and there is the alternative of democratic socialism, achieved by gradual and peaceable means. The prestige of Britain, too, is high, and has been enormously enhanced by the victory of British labor. If the Labor Party successfully fulfills its enormous responsibilities, it can become the leader and perhaps the unifying cement of a continent which badly needs cohesion. The action of the French Socialists, who recently voted not to unite organically with the Communists, though continuing to coöperate with them, is a portent of the trend.

The European and British peoples do not fear armed aggression from the Soviet Union and will never offer a threat to Russian security. They entertain no romantic ideas about altering the way Russia conducts her internal affairs. But they expect reciprocity in this respect. Every action by Communist parties which seems to be inspired more by Soviet policy than by domestic requirements will lessen Soviet influence abroad. The scene is being set for a great experiment in democratic socialism, perhaps covering all Europe, alongside the differently orientated Soviet experiment. Europeans want no more dictatorships, whether of the Right or of the Left. The more farsighted of them do want continental unity, at least in the economic realm. The more Russia seems to stand in the way of this tendency, the stronger the tendency is likely to become.

It is against this prospect that we must evaluate political developments. The chief enemies of European socialist democracy have been vanquished, at home and abroad. Now the variants in policy within the victorious Left are rising to the surface. It is among these that the significant differences will occur. The situation calls for reasonable forebearance on the part of all, but not for timorous maintenance of artificial unison in order to prevent the dominance of reaction.

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A Journal of Opinion

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Democracy v. Tyranny in Bulgaria

THE WHEEL OF HISTORY has come full circle in Bulgaria. Within the short period of one year this erstwhile vassal of Hitler's Axis has become a satellite of the Red Star. Nobody should know this better than Winston Churchill whose recent remarks in the House of Commons—hypocritical as they were in view of the role he himself played in dividing the Balkans into Russian and British spheres of influence—are certainly applicable to Bulgaria. "Almost everywhere," Churchill said of Eastern Europe, "Communist forces have obtained or are in the process of obtaining dictatorial powers," wisely adding that this "does not mean that everywhere has communism been established nor does it mean that it will be established."

As leader of his Majesty's "loyal opposition" Mr. Churchill can afford to say what he did not dare say as his Majesty's first minister. But if Mr. Churchill cannot be critical with a clear conscience, Labor's new Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, can. The governments which have been set up in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, Mr. Bevin reported to the House of Commons on August 20, "do not in our view represent the majority of the people and the impression we get from recent developments is that one kind of totalitarianism is being replaced by another."

Mr. Bevin's apprehensions cannot be brushed aside as being motivated by British power politics. For the facts speak for Mr. Bevin. Whatever one may say in justification of the political and economic changes that are taking place in the Balkans, they are not "democratic" changes in our meaning of that much overworked word. Whether "democracy" as we understand it is possible in the Balkan countries at this time is, of course, another question. If the policy instituted there after the arrival of the Red Army were inevitable, little could be said against it. This is particularly true of Bulgaria. But is it the "only possible" policy? And if not, is there an alternative?

An answer is difficult because of the tight curtain of censorship that has been drawn around Bulgaria. Lack of detailed information makes it mandatory, therefore, to treat all reports—favorable and unfavorable—with the utmost discretion. Only by judging them against the proper social, political and economic background is it safe to draw some definite conclusions.

It is an axiom of Bulgarian politics that no government hostile to the Soviet Union can maintain itself in power. It would be almost unanimously opposed by the Bulgarian people which, for historical and cultural reasons, is deeply attached to the "big brother" in the Slavic family of nations. Bulgaria's pro-Nazi governments of the last few years, though at war with Great Britain and the United States, never dared to join Hitler's "holy crusade" against Russia. Throughout the war years, political murders, mass demonstrations and sabotage suggested the Bulgarian people's dissatisfaction with the government's pro-German foreign policy. If there was any country in Eastern Europe where the Soviet armies could expect to be received with open arms, it was Bulgaria. And whatever government would have come to power after the ouster of the old ruling class, it could be counted on to be sincerely friendly to Russia.

Of all the countries of Eastern Europe, moreover, none has a greater democratic potential than Bulgaria. The Bulgarian peasants, constituting 80 percent of the population, hold their land in absolute freehold and are used to a long democratic tradition as a result of communal ownership of pasture and woodland. During the years of fascist opposition it was the Peasant Party, and not the Communists, which was the most powerful rallying point for Bulgaria's revolutionary elements. The Communists, of course, aided by the fortuitous circumstance of traditional Russo-Bulgarian friendship, were also very active. And it was the Communists who took the lead in forming the Fatherland Front which soon united all anti-fascist parties, including the Agrarians and Social Democrats, which resisted foreign and domestic totalitarianism.

The program of the Fatherland Front insisted that "all political rights of the people must be reëstablished and freedom of the press reinstated as well as public meetings and organizations permitted." It warned that it would defend "national, economic, political and labor interests against foreign interference," and demanded a "high standard of living for urban and rural populations." The program called for revolutionary action against fascism: "All Bulgarians must unite to overthrow the present treacherous, Hitler-controlled government and replace it by a government of the people that will represent the whole nation and the true Bulgarian spirit."

When Russia declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, 1944, the Soviet government expressly referred to "Bulgarian ruling circles" as the culprits responsible for their country's plight. On the following day, the Moscow radio urged the Bulgarian people to revolt against the "ruling clique" and to "take fate into their own hands." The government that came into power after the armistice was genuinely representative of all the popular resistance forces. Although it included members of the *Zveno*—the Republican Officers' League which, in spite of its conservative political coloration, was uncompromising in its opposition to the unpopular alliance with the Axis—it also included, in addition to Communists, a number of

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left-wing and middle-of-the-road liberals. Best known among these were Petko Staynoff, the Foreign Minister, who belonged to the so-called "tolerated opposition" led by Nicola Muchanoff; and Nikola Petkoff, a Minister without Portfolio, one of the leaders of the leftist "Stamboliski Wing" of the Peasant Party. This government, it was assumed, was acceptable to the Soviet Union not because of its leftism, but because it had popular support which promised to stabilize the country's internal political situation and thus lead the way to firm postwar friendship with the USSR.

Its first action—deposing the pro-fascist three-man regency council and arresting all pro-Axis government officials and parliamentarians—found general approval. It suggested that the government could be expected to translate into reality the democratic program of the Fatherland Front. Free elections in Bulgaria, most observers believed, would mean an even more leftist government than what was thought of as a strictly temporary administration.

But as soon as the government was firmly installed, an almost impenetrable news blackout descended on Bulgaria. There were ominous reports of the liquidation not only of fascists and collaborationists, but also of liberals and Peasant Party leaders who tried to follow a political course different from that of the now increasingly Communist-controlled Fatherland Front. The fate of some of these, including well known democrats like Nicola Muchanoff, Athanase Buroff and Dimiter Gitcheff, remains a mystery. More recently, Dr. G. M. Dimitroff, former secretary-general of the Peasant Party, found it necessary to seek refuge with the American diplomatic representative in Sofia to protect himself against threatened physical violence. Moderate ministers have become the object of suddenly staged "popular demonstrations."

The two main democratic parties, the Agrarians and Social Democrats, silently, if reluctantly, continued to coöperate with the Communists in the Fatherland Front because it seemed the only way to insure the nation against a recurrence of fascism. Moreover, a break with the Communists would certainly have been interpreted as an unfriendly act against the Soviet Union. Their own helplessness automatically strengthened the well organized Communist Party which, though numerically small compared with the other parties, apparently hoped to entrench itself in power before the democratic opposition had a chance to resist the trend toward a Communist dictatorship. The issue came to a head, however, when the Communists tried to put their control over on the Bulgarian people through the device of "democratic elections." At last, democratic cabinet members rose in protest and asked the Allied Control Commission to supervise the elections which had been scheduled for August 26. They were immediately forced to resign and abuse was heaped upon them. Nikola Petkoff, for instance, a man of unquestionable anti-fascist and democratic convictions, was charged by the Sofia radio with "seeking external interference in order to guarantee the unity of all disguised Fascists."

This is the background of the American and British protest which led to the last-minute postponement of the elections by the Bulgarian government. The electoral law, Mr. Bevin had declared, "is not in our view consistent with the principles of liberty. . . . Our views of what constitutes a free election are well known, but any elections held with all the restrictions and exclusions laid down in the Bulgarian law would run entirely contrary to our conception of a free election." The Bulgarian law was indeed anything but democratic. It was so drawn up that it would have insured the inevitable triumph of the parties belonging to the Fatherland Front. The Fatherland Front would have presented the voter with a single ticket, the apportionment of seats in the *Sobranje* (parliament) having been agreed upon in advance. The Communist and Peasant Parties were to receive 95 seats each, the *Zveno*, 47 and the Social Democrats, 32. This left exactly six seats for independent candidates. Although opposition tickets were to be permitted, the law excluded both voters and candidates who "are known for their fascist convictions." As everybody outside of the well purged Fatherland Front is conveniently labeled "fascist," the outcome of the elections would have been a foregone conclusion.

Even if the law had been acceptable from a democratic point of view, the grant of 95 seats to the Communists would probably have been out of proportion to their actual numerical strength. The plebiscitary nature of the law could not conceal, but rather revealed, knowledge of their relative weakness. The collective Fatherland Front ticket was nothing but a subterfuge to guarantee Communist political domination of what on the surface would appear to be a united-front government.

The door to democracy in Bulgaria is still open. The key is held by the Big Three. If Russia wants her neighbors to have political stability, there is no reason why she should not agree to a *modus operandi* similar to that effected in Poland. For a government that comes out of controlled elections cannot be safely counted upon to guarantee the country's internal stability. If the Russians insist on continuing to encourage the Bulgarian Communist Party, it can only have the effect of estranging the democratic-minded Bulgarian people. It is no secret any longer that just as the Greeks are anxiously waiting for the withdrawal of British troops, the Bulgarians are waiting for the Russians to leave. If the Russians want the friendship of the Bulgarian people, they can only welcome the Anglo-American objection to the existing government.

HEINZ EULAU

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What's the Matter with Texas?

BY COMMON REPORT the United States has helped Texas win the war. Texas girls are the nation's prettiest, as was "proved" only recently by photographic evidence. To movie fans throughout the world it is well known that every man in Texas is over six feet tall, walks with a saddle-gaited shamble, and addresses his fellow-citizens as "pardner." Nowhere else is the sun half as bright or the air half as clear. (In Texas there are no "high fogs" and no rainy season: California and Florida please copy.) No other grapefruit are as sweet and juicy. More beef, more oil, more cotton are produced in Texas than in any other state, to mention only the best known Texas "firsts."

But Texas is a land of contrasts. Not only does it extend from the subtropics of the lower valley to the subarctic of the upper Panhandle; it also reaches all the way from the statesmanship of Sam Houston, Stephen F. Austin and Mirabeau B. Lamar to the political squalor of Ferguson and O'Daniel. No other state has impeached and convicted a governor of felony and then "vindicated" him by electing his wife governor for two terms. For common political chicanery other states have established high marks. Doubtless they could top the case of the simple flour salesman who campaigns successfully against "the professional politicians," only to become an arch-professional himself. Campaigning against the sales tax and then immediately sponsoring a whopping "transactions tax" is old stuff, and so is campaign denunciation of the poll tax followed by participation in a filibuster against a bill to abolish it. But there is a truly Texan magnificence in the perfidy of a man who can appeal to the Christian sentiments of the people at the crossroads by sobbing their favorite hymns over the radio and begging them to remember him in their prayers when he isn't even a member of a church.

Other states participated in what President Roosevelt called a nationwide conspiracy engineered by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (this, I am happy to recall, was before the time of Mr. Johnston) to secure the repeal or emasculation of the Wages and Hours Act. But no other state dropped three economists from its state university for venturing to protest against the public representation of the Act as limiting workers in defense plants to a forty-hour week. Other states participated in the recent attempt to steal the national election by having electors throw their votes to another candidate than the one the voters had decreed, but this interesting scheme seems to have originated in Texas. Other states have felt the anti-union blandishments of the Christian Americans (and by the way, what silly scruple deterred these gentlemen from invoking "motherhood" too, while they were about it?), but Houston seems to have been chosen as the appropriate headquarters of such an outfit.

Why? What's the matter with Texas, anyhow?

There is no doubt at all that something is the matter. But in my opinion, for whatever it may be worth, the trouble with Texas isn't Texas. It's the world. If Texas seems to have an unusually bad case, people must remember that Texas provides an unusually large sample of the world. After all, this is true of other things than climate and topography. What passes unnoticed in other places may be very conspicuous when it is viewed on the scale of Texas.

As the reader will see shortly, this isn't said under the spell of local sentiment. Texans know just as well as other people that mere size is nothing to brag about and that the size of the state isn't a personal quality of its citizens. A thousand miles is no longer in Texas than elsewhere. And they know much better than the rest of the world that Hollywood and Tin Pan Alley have a perversely false idea of Texas. While there are still large areas of Texas (larger, as we love to say, than many another state) where the jingle-jangle-jingle of spurs can still be heard, most Texans have no more use for the accouterments of the open range than the citizens of Akron, Ohio. Only a tiny fraction of the Texas population ever saw a round-up except in the movies, and even they never saw a longhorn steer. In the beef factories of Texas, Herefords and other highly bred meat-producing strains now prevail to the total exclusion of the range steers Andy Adams knew.

It is true that during the first year of the war Texas topped the nation in ratio of volunteers to population. Texans are proud of that record. But they know how few of those boys were Red Ryders from the open spaces. Probably the concentration of army aviation in the Southwest had more to do with the rate of enlistment than ranching did. The fact is that the population of Texas is urban to a degree not yet generally appreciated by the rest of the world. The Brooklyn boys who write the songs of the open range use "Dallas" as a rhyme for saddle "callous," but they would be as likely to get saddle galls in Dallas as to find bison in Buffalo, New York. The beauties whom *Life's* photographer discovered there were passing in and out of one of the main entrances of the Neiman Marcus store, which is one of not more than a dozen or so top-quality stores of the nation. As such it attracts and highlights beauty just as Saks Fifth Avenue might be expected to do. The pictures were impressive, but they were pictures of debutantes, not cowgirls.

In my opinion the urban population of Texas is pri-

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marily responsible for the Texas myth. People are continually exclaiming over the number of Texans they encounter in New York or Washington. But why not? The population of Texas is nearly half that of New York State. No one makes a point of the number of New Yorkers to be found in Washington. But if the states were represented in the nation's capital in strict proportion to their population, there should be one Texan for every two New Yorkers. When you meet a man from Wyoming or Nevada at a Washington dinner party he is just as likely as the man from Texas to be a corporation lawyer or an economist, but in all three cases you expect him to be bowlegged from long years in the saddle; and this expectation is conferred on two and a half times as many Texans as on all the citizens of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming combined. That, I think, is why Texas outranks Wyoming and Nevada in song and fable.

I have emphasized these vital statistics because they have more than a mythological significance. Our present problem also is a consequence of the growth of urban population and of the causes of that growth. Those causes are, of course, industrial. For the most part the growth has been recent and rapid. As recently as the turn of the century Houston, the second city of the South and Texas' industrial capital, was a small town. Texas oil was then unknown and King Cotton had not yet moved his throne across the Mississippi.

The developments of the past half century have had two significant effects. The pioneers who settled the great open spaces of the state have become a stranded population, and leadership has passed from a sort of landed aristocracy to the Big Money.

The temptation for their descendants to magnify the virtues of the early settlers is obvious and strong. Doubtless some of them were fugitives from justice. That is true in all new countries. Even the story of the crossroads with the signs pointing to Arkansas and to Texas, ". . . . and everybody who could read went to Texas," doesn't pay the pioneers any very high compliment. Nevertheless, pioneering is a selective process. It took courage to set out and endurance to arrive. The men and women whom Moses and Stephen Austin led from Connecticut to what was then the wilderness of northern Mexico must have been hardy folk. The families who left their homes, or the ruins of their homes, in the Confederacy immediately after the war between the states to make a fresh start on the Texas frontier were not the least enterprising members of their old communities. I hope I don't exaggerate because my own family was one of them. Granted that the settlers were not, one and all, paragons of culture and refinement, granted that their literary tastes and their theological convictions were not the most advanced in the world, even of their time, still they were not conspicuously behind their times.

Two generations later many of them are. The descendants of the pioneers now people the "piney woods" of eastern Texas, the erstwhile dust bowl, the great plains. They still live much as their settler forebears lived and think much as they thought. They are covered-wagon individualists, "agin the government" and all its works and only too ready to make common cause with the simple flour salesman who is setting forth on his Rosinante to fight the "professional politicians." They are Fundamentalists, deeply suspicious of the Yankee heresies of the Northern branches of their churches and only too ready to be shocked at rumors of impiety in their university.

Most important of all: they have lost their leadership. The leaders of the pioneers were indeed great men, quite comparable to the John Winthrops and William Penns of early American history. That was true of the fathers of the Texas Republic, and it was also true (though much less known outside of the state) of the men, in several cases feudal aristocrats, who led whole communities of their fellow citizens from Germany and Bohemia to Texas in the very early days and after the collapse of the revolutionary hopes of 1848. Theirs was a moral leadership in which rank was sustained by character.

I am not going to argue that feudalism was nicer than capitalism. The point is that suddenly acquired power is always dangerous. The men who now control the destinies of this vast empire (as we love to call it) are not all new men, but a great many of them are. They are men who have struck oil, men who have made quick fortunes in the sudden inflation of urban property values, and the like. Some of them are second and third generation descendants of early landgrabbers, and that cultural heritage is their greatest liability. For theirs is a tradition not of the moral leadership that guided communities of pioneers to a new home in a strange land but of ruthless buccaneering in the acquisition of principalities. Even the administration of such territories in a cultural medium in which trespassers are assumed to be rustlers, claimjumpers, or poachers and as such are shot on sight, one in which the subject population is largely of "inferior race," both Mexican and Negro, and one in which the peace officers and courts are officials of "the county in the northeast corner of papa's ranch," leaves something to be desired as a humanizing process.

These men love Texas. They love the university. (It goes without saying that for many years most of the regents have been graduates of the university.) In other circumstances theirs might have been, or at least seemed to be, an enlightened despotism. But what seems enlightened in one period may be positively obscurantist in another. What is enlightenment but capacity for change? Of recent former members of the university board of regents one was a passionate devotee of classical scholarship; another was a collector

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of rare books. Both sincerely deplored the prevailing trends in contemporary literature and scholarship, just as all these men sincerely and vigorously (and how vigorously!) deplore contemporary trends in government and, say, industrial relations. They are determined to outlaw the closed shop for the same reason they are determined that our students shan't read Dos Passos, by the same clear certainty of conviction and by appeal to the same prejudices.

In short, the trouble in Texas is the product of two forces: entrenched power and inevitable change. The same irresistible force of industrialization which produced the wealth these men control is also bringing industrial unionism and a great university, and it is fetching up against the immovable wall of financial and political power, highly concentrated and well organized, and buttressed by pioneer sentiment hardened to ingrained prejudice. It isn't surprising that the consequence is a certain amount of heat.

That, I think, is the Texas story. But isn't it also the story of America, or even of Western civilization? I think so. One could easily pick out a half-a-dozen crises in American history, or that of the Western world, in which the over-all pattern is the same. If the men who rule Texas are trying to build a wall around the state to keep out unionism, and governmental meddling, and contemporary literature, and new economic ideas, what are the isolationists doing? Aren't they also trying to secede from the world in the fatuous hope that what is happening elsewhere won't happen here?

For it is fatuous, of course. The rulers of Texas really want the "university of the first class" for which the state constitution originally provided. But you can't have a real university without its being more or less grown up. They also want more industry, for after all the industrialization of the state is the source of their own power. But you can't have industry without having a self-conscious working class. Obviously we don't know all the answers, by a long shot. We don't know yet whether we can have super-bombers without acquiring the super-state. However, we do know that we can't keep on very long the way we are. Global change is already overdue, and it seems unlikely that even Texas will be an exception to the universal rule.

CLARENCE E. AYRES

Freedom or Automatism

The Dilemma of Man in Modern Mass Society

IN THE autumn of 1941, on my return from several years in Italy and Germany, I was invited to visit the White House. For an hour President Roosevelt asked me questions about developments behind the Axis lines. Knowing that I had spent five years in the same area in the middle 1920's, the President was particularly interested to know whether and how fascism had changed. He asked whether a generation of fascism had helped or hurt the Italians in their capacity to cope with the problems of modern war, and then he told an anecdote to illustrate exactly what he wanted to know. Some months before, he related, 20 crated American airplanes of a new type had been shipped to the British in Egypt. Because the machines were rather delicate, with a tendency to nose over at the take-off, they were assembled and tested by specially chosen British expert mechanics. Despite careful handling, a number of the airplanes were badly damaged. At almost exactly the same time, an identical number of the same type of airplanes had been sent to the Russians. Although routine personnel handled them, not one was damaged. All were in service in less time than it took the British to get theirs into the air. At this point in his narrative, the President lifted both his hands with the fingers of each spread apart. Then with the thumb and first two fingers of his right hand, he capped one after another of the fingers of his left hand. "I can remember," he said, "that when I was a young man we used to think that all the Russians were *mujiks* with five clumsy thumbs on each hand. Sometimes now, I think that perhaps the most important thing that has happened to Russia, maybe even to the whole world, is the fact that the Russians have learned in a mere quarter of a century what we thought they never could learn—how to use their hands." On Italy, I reported to the President that fascism had made the Italians less well able to use not only their hands but also their heads and their hearts; the false discipline of fascism had impaired without replacing the natural humane disciplines; a mechanized militarism had strengthened the Italians' traditional dislike of the Germans and intelligent dislike of *"il modo di vivere trionfale."*

Lenin must have been thinking of the need to transform *mujiks* into mechanics when he said: "Socialism is Soviets plus electrification." Under Stalin the Russians may not have achieved socialism in the form Lenin intended, but they have made giant strides toward the application of modern technology to their economic life, and even greater strides toward the psychology of modern technology: they have learned not only how to use their hands but also how to make, use and "understand" machines to a degree that would have been considered unimaginable a quarter of a cen-

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tury ago. In the light of the historical past, of centuries of ignorantism, the fact that Russian war materiel, although often inferior to American, German or British, has nevertheless been comparable, is a significant comment on the sovietism with which Stalin has replaced socialism. Sovietism is a system of politics based on socialized economics and implemented by technological methods learned in large part from capitalist America and pre-Nazi Germany. Before the Russians received through lend-lease the airplanes, tanks, vehicles and other war materiel which speeded their advance to Vienna and Berlin, they had obtained as much instruction for the building of their war machine from Henry Ford as they had from Karl Marx.

It is not as well known, however, that lessons learned from America also helped the Germans to build their war machine; if the Soviet war machine was in some respects an altered copy of American blueprints, the Nazi was a maleficently effective caricature. Indeed, every element which contributed to the making of the Nazi war machine was a purposefully deformed version of some borrowed original. Even the fascism which went into it was as much changed from its original Italian form as was the socialism which helped in the making of the Russian war machine. German Nazism was fascism plus the "politicalization" of modern mass technology plus the mechanization of modern mass psychology. It was a system of power based on the deliberate, compulsory and "total" application to politics and political psychology of the methods of modern business and industry, a system of "making" and using human beings by methods developed for the making and using of inanimate things. Under Nazism, society itself and all its human-political aspects were so mechanized and dehumanized that ultimately assembly-line techniques for the making of things were applied to the extinction of human beings, the shining mechanical perfection of River Rouge was transformed into the stinking human horror of Maidanek and Buchenwald. As the symptoms of disease are often distorted aggravations of health, so the Nazi ideas and methods which led to so much destroying and killing are deformations of American methods and ideas of making and creating. The Nazi war machine was a Frankenstein which rolled off a monstrous assembly line. To crush the Nazis we had not only to waste much blood and treasure, we also had to transform ourselves into a non-productive war machine draining precious energies and skills from useful activity. Of course, in the end, we destroyed the destroyers; but lest we have to do it again, while we still have the full realization of what it cost, we had better inquire into how, in the first place, we unwittingly helped to make the unmakers. We know about the scrap iron we sold the Japanese, the loans we made to the Germans; some of us do not know that we freely gave the Nazis a few important elements of the one thing which more than any other made them hard to beat. The fact that they debased and deformed it does not make it any the less a gift.

We gave the Nazis one of the most extraordinary things we had learned in the last quarter of a century —a superior strategy of mechanization of the technology of material production, wedded to a superior strategy of standardization of the human and psychological elements of a technologically collective society. Once we got started in the war against the Nazis, our long head start in industrialization canceled out their long head start in militarization. In a war of machines, we had more machines, were better at everything connected with machines. If we are realistic as well as honest, we know that it was neither our superior morality, nor our superior men, nor even our superior machines which won: we beat the Nazis because we had more men and more machines; we beat them because the British, exploiting a narrow strip of water, and the Russians, exploiting vast reaches of land, used space to give us time to make the machines and furnish the men. But we had to smash Germany to pieces before we did it; far from cracking or collapsing, the Nazis were able to hold us off long after their material situation was hopeless: it is fair to say that no element in Nazi Germany proved to be stronger than morale. Fascist morale—the Italian, and all the other varieties —crumbled; Nazi morale held off great armies of Americans and Russians after the German armies were shattered hulks, stood against vast numbers of machines on the ground and in the air after the German machines were all but gone. Neither the German temperament nor the German military tradition provides an adequate explanation; this did not happen in the last war. Nor does the notion that the Germans were terrified by the Gestapo and Goebbels into fighting offer more than a small part of the explanation.

Nazi morale was the product of the de-personalization, the de-individualization of the Germans into emotionally standardized units of a psychological mass. A temperamentally orderly and traditionally methodically minded people, the Germans were "educated" into "thinking with the blood" by what amounted to a gigantic controlled experiment in conditioning human beings to subordinate their intellectually reasoning faculties to their feelings, and to exchange their individual expression for mass-communal participation in the will of the state. The myths, the mysticism, the fanaticism, the goals were a tribalized, a religified deformation of fascism. Some of the methods were deformed and corrupted adaptations from America. Nazi morale was a new version of fascist fanaticism plus a "politicalization" of the American strategy of mechanization of the technology of material mass production plus a new technique of mechanized "mass production" of standardized human beings and standardized psychological patterns. The Nazi state profited by

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ideas, methods, techniques which had made American business profit; the Nazi state "made" men, and made men think and feel by variants of the methods by which we made things and permitted masses of men to enjoy the use of them. What the Nazi state took from us for its war machine, we would not and could not use for ours; we try to keep business and politics in separate water-tight compartments and, although our psychological "collectivism" is one of the firmest supports of our type of free-enterprise profit system, we have a horror of political collectivism. Even in our gravest national emergency, we remained the only great nation careful to avoid fighting a "political war." Granting that we neither could nor would arm ourselves in such a fashion, even though it might have shortened the war, it remains surprising that we could not even recognize such armament; that the strategists of our psychological warfare against the Nazis used until the end methods which would have been excellent in 1918 but were useless against Nazi Germany.

Without the model T Ford and what it led to, the Nazi state would not have been possible because, under the Nazis, the Germans were "made" on the assembly line. Given the proper controls, the right standards and dies and appropriate managerial skill, it is no more miraculous than the Kaiser shipyards, indeed, it is far less miraculous than TVA. American technical genius plus American business enterprise created the modern economic phenomenon of the "mass"—mass production, mass market, mass distribution. As a by-product of the mechanical standardization such production entailed, came the high standard of living and, with it, a high measure of standardization of the psychological factors of taste and appetite: to make things in the mass, the means of production were fully mechanized; to distribute the best possible things to the widest possible mass of human beings, a large measure of psychological standardization was necessary. The Nazis twisted this pattern to suit their ends. They used the methods of economic production for political purposes; they fully standardized and mechanized not only political but also psychological "production," and they arrived at mass thinking, mass feeling and ultimately that total "psychological mass" which Le Bon and Freud have described. The American political term, "the masses," has nothing whatsoever to do with the psychological-political mass of the totalitarian state: American economic mass production has much to do with it. Because we have no equivalent of Nazism in our thinking and feeling, we fail to note that there is a relationship between a man thrusting his arm forward in a political salute and a man thrusting his arm forward to punch a time card in a factory. That which is *ersatz* American in Nazism needs a searching second look to be recognized because its place and purpose have been perverted. With that second look, however, we can find much that is familiar. Geopolitics owes much to our continentalism, *Lebensraum* to our frontierism, the "new order" to our long series of new, different, unique and, usually, superior Americanisms —the new world, new nation, new justice, new freedom, new era, new deal. American salesmanship and advertising were the dry runs and trial heats for Nazi propaganda; free selling of things became controlled, monopolistic imposition of ideas and feelings. P. T. Barnum was the grand-dad of the Nuremberg rallies. Southern California has long known about "strength through joy." The traditions of the Yale Bowl plus Bernarr Macfadden and the physical culturists plus the Boy Scouts turn up—deformed, of course—in the *Hitlerjugend* and Nazi athleticism. Anti-trust laws notwithstanding, we created the modern sense of the word, monopoly. What was the Nazi state if not a gigantic vertical trust striving for an autarchy which Henry Ford would understand? Long before Nazism, the Germans were efficient, but it took the Nazis to bring to rank flowering Taylorism and the Bedeaux system.

Nor can the seamy side of our economic life be neglected in a list of Nazi borrowings. The bootleggers, the labor racketeers, the gangsters; the step-up, the shake-down and the snatch, all found their way to the Nazis: what was occasional and punishable crime to us became habitual and accepted practice to them. The SS men who rescued Mussolini and planned to kidnap Eisenhower used a technique borrowed from the St. Valentine's Day massacre in Chicago. The organized illegally legal violence of the Vigilantes and the legally illegal violence of the Ku Klux Klan had undoubtedly been carefully studied by the Gestapo, the *Abwehr*, the SS and the SA men. Gangster torture methods were probably compared with those from Nuremberg's medieval archives. The Nazis took our evils and twisted them into their virtues; they took some of our virtues and corrupted them into vices; but everything they took stopped being sporadic, partial, occasional, and became an integrated element in a system whose sole goal was power.

Hitler's equivalent of Lenin's transformation of the Russian *mujik* into the Soviet mechanic was a transformation of the German man into a Nazi mecano-man. This entity—it can scarcely be called a being—is as remote from the American man as racism is from the "melting pot." What "politicalization" of American mass technique provided was the processing, the packaging, and the framework in which the dehumanized "product" could be exploited. To make the motor which made this mechanism tick, the Nazis used their own version of fascism. They mobilized in the service of the Nazi state the naked aggression, the raw and primitive passions which the German, when he still was a normal, law-abiding, custom-observing man, had not used even for his own private, individual purposes. They destroyed the old emotional disciplines, sanctioning instinctual attitudes and conduct

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which had been prohibited by civilized law or suppressed by moral training, putting a high premium on the evil impulses which had been repressed into inhibition in the Pandora's box of the individual German's Unconscious. For the old disciplines, new ones had to be substituted. An emotional primitive, the Nazi mecanoman had to have an equivalent of the ancient tribal magical animism of nature. The Nazis observed that while the Russians were, in President Roosevelt's phrase, learning how to use their hands, we had been learning not only how to use machines but almost how to live as brothers of machines, as fellow gods of the machines; we were acquiring so deep a "kinship" with the ever more numerous mechanisms which played increasingly important parts in our lives that at times we seemed to "humanize" machines. An almost forgotten yet not insignificant expression of our attitude was Lindbergh's reference to his airplane and himself as "we." The special flavor of our supreme fetish, the American standard of living, is intimately connected with that "we"—with a reciprocal service between our gadget-gods and ourselves. There is no exact historical parallel for such a relationship. The tools of the artisan craftsman were almost as much a part of him as his hands, but they were not machines in the modern, standardized, interchangeable mechanical sense. Sailors have personalized their ships but that is a far cry from the personalization of a bombing plane, an automobile, a washing-machine. The American's "kinship" with a mass-produced assembly-line object, good for a season or two, more closely resembles a mechanical animism. We humanized and, in a certain sense, deified machines. The Nazis studied us as carefully as they studied everybody else. Then they found how they could use what they had observed. They "humanized" and "deified" the state itself, and they dehumanized and mechanized the Germans into mecanomen.

The American strategy of standardization helped the Nazis because it provided for them an element in the kind of mass discipline they sought—a least common denominator of the factor, man—a uniformity in conformity in a process of identification. Americans are neither regimented nor dragooned; they have many choices in soap, jobs, books, ideas, politicians, radio programs, prejudices; but an individualism which goes so far as to rebel at the idea of standardization tends to be considered un-American. The products of mechanization have been made to seem identical with America itself, the American idea, the American way of life, the American standard of living. Nor is the standardization confined to things; it embraces also symbols of things and mechanically symbolized feelings. Through Hollywood and the radio, life and death, love and hate all fall into patterns; through the press and other instrumentalities of information and enlightenment, the questions and the answers of modern life, hopes and fears, approvals and condemnations also fall into patterns. The Nazis may have known that William Howard Taft once said that the inertia of the people and not their impulsiveness was the great danger to democracy. They saw that we were good democrats but they also saw that in a system of material mechanization and psychological standardization such as ours there were lessons to be learned about the inertness, passivity, conformity of men in the mass. In our wonderfully prosperous and peaceful land, there were strong tendencies to take a high level of standardized economic collectivism as the proof of individual political freedom, to equate material well-being with moral and spiritual fulfillment. If large numbers of men could be made to prefer canned foods to fresh, even when fresh foods were equally accessible at equal prices, why was it not possible to make them accept processed thoughts and feelings? If material things could be made into benevolent household deities, why could not men be made into malevolent machines? If free men could be induced to live and feel in patterns, what limits are there to the patterns which can be imposed on mecanomen? If man in the mass confuses identity with other men in the mass with individualism, if he finds political liberty in economic prosperity, why can he not be made content with being a cell in a state organism, a bolt or screw in a state machine, a sacrificial offering in a state religion? Why cannot mysticism be injected into materialism, automatism into standardized mechanization? In each case, the Nazi answer was affirmative. It could be done and it was done, on a grand scale.

For our notion of "keeping up with the Joneses" to maintain the highest standard of material living in the world, they substituted keeping out the Jews and keeping down all non-Nazis to maintain for the *Herrenvolk* the highest standard of purity in the world. Mystical communion replaced material well-being. A uniformity in deprivation had to pinch-hit for a uniformity in acquisitive prosperity, conspicuous sacrifice for conspicuous waste, propaganda for advertising, regimentation for salesmanship, compulsion for choice. In the Nazi mecanoman, there was a button he himself could not press for every thought or feeling; a switch for every action, even a plug to stop feeling, thought or action. The Nazi mecanoman had the "soul" of a primitive, the instincts of a psychopath, the conditioned psychological reflexes in caricatured perfection of the mass man, all operating in the structural framework of an assembly-line mechanical product. The Nazi war machine is smashed. The Nazi mecanoman, while still a problem, is no longer a danger: a mass product, he cannot function outside a mass. The elements which went into making him are negatively important as providing a frame of reference for what to avoid in the psychological conditioning of free men. Four great things have come out of this war: first,

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the harnessing of atomic energy; second, robot bombs, jet propulsion and the other scientific bases for automatic war; third, DDT, the insecticide which arms man in the permanent war of defense against the insect world; and, fourth, penicillin, which strengthens man's armament in the permanent war of defense against the bacteriological world. Thus far we have no weapon to protect us from men who try to make gods of themselves and their state by making mechanisms out of men; we have no means of preventing evil men from trying again to derange nature's patterns. Yet, unless psychology comes abreast with some new means of arming man himself in the great and permanent war against himself, against his recurrent efforts to be more than man or less than man, modern man's—that is, mass man's—animisms, mysticisms, automatisms will make him an easy prey for the future masters of automatic warfare. PERCY WINNER

The TVA from War to Peace

WITH THE END of the war, the Tennessee Valley Authority entered upon its supreme test. During its first six or seven years, its main activity was to spend money on the construction of dams and other projects, money appropriated by Congress. It is not hard to spend successfully, given adequate technical information and sound judgment. Next, from the beginning of the war until August 14, 1945, the Valley was humming, like every other part of America, because of the war effort, in which TVA power and other TVA facilities played an important part. But from now on, assuming that peace has really arrived, and is here for keeps, the TVA will meet its first great test. Can it bring prosperity to the Valley under highly competitive peacetime conditions? And if so, how will its record compare with that of other parts of America, especially if we have a depression?

The directors of the TVA are not afraid of this challenge. Their attitude is one of confidence in spite of the fact that, as David Lilienthal, chairman of the Board, says, there has been so much favorable and highly lyrical description of the TVA that people may be led to expect more of it than is possible. Chairman Lilienthal is keenly aware that by and large, prosperity in the Valley is still dependent on prosperity in the country as a whole, even though at any given level, the people of the Valley are far better off than they were before the coming of the TVA. In other words, you should not expect miracles.

Mr. Lilienthal is right, of course. Nevertheless, if you make a tour of the Valley, as I did not long ago, it is hard to avoid becoming lyrical about at least some aspects of it. For it is certainly true that the national experiment which has been conducted there has had remarkable results. It has worked with a low-income region, some areas of which were becoming almost uninhabitable, and has set it on the road to prosperity and renewed life. It has done this, in part, by rescuing the soil from the deadly cancer of erosion. It has eliminated the danger of floods on the Tennessee River and its tributaries, and thereby reduced the maximum harm of floods on the Mississippi all the way to New Orleans. It has created approximately 1,680,000 kilowatts of new electricity, much of which has gone into the war effort. It has produced a new paradise for sportsmen, whose artificial lakes actually have a shoreline greater than that of the continental United States itself. It has almost done away, within its own boundaries, with that scourge of the South, malaria. It has raised the standards of health, education and community coöperation in a dozen ways.

Perhaps a few background facts may be useful in giving a quick picture of the Valley as it is today. This enterprise grew out of the fact that, during the First World War, a great nitrate plant (now largely technologically obsolete) was created at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River in northern Alabama. After various suggestions had been made about what to do with this plant and the accompanying dam for electric power, including giving it to Henry Ford for the nominal price of $5 million, the idea gradually developed of making it part of a true regional development of the Tennessee River and its tributaries, for four purposes: flood control, soil improvement, navigation and hydroelectric power. The enterprise became one of the first of the New Deal projects, benefiting from the high vision and firm purpose of President Roosevelt and the good luck by which a man of David Lilienthal's abilities was persuaded to become a board member, and later, chairman.

Since that time Congress has appropriated about $668 million for TVA, which has also used proceeds from the sale of bonds, and surplus revenues from its operations, to carry on its program. Probably no such sums would ever have been authorized for any one or even two of the several purposes of the TVA, but the argument of all the purposes together was irresistible. TVA now has an investment of about $655 million in navigation, flood control and power facilities, of which $400 million represents the power investment. While the power is sold at reasonable rates, it is at present earning about four percent on the investment in the hydroelectric installations. The cost of these could be amortized, without interest, in about 30 years, or if interest at two percent were charged, in about 60 years. Not many private investments in the

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United States in recent times have done much better.

As suggested, the hydroelectric power that has been created through the work of the TVA has played an enormously important part in the American war effort. More than half of all the aluminum produced in the United States is processed in the Tennessee Valley. In addition, there are planes, ships, fibers for tires, army uniforms, shoes, explosives, rayon, oxygen, hydrogen, sulphuric and acetic acids, ferro-alloys, caustic soda, phosphorus, methyl alcohol and many other things. It was the huge quantity of TVA power that was largely responsible for locating one of the two chief atomic-bomb plants in the Valley.

Abundant electricity at low rates (the average householder pays less than two cents per kilowatt hour) has resulted in relieving the burden of household drudgery in half a million homes. The use of electricity in the Valley per capita is twice the national average. In a city like Chattanooga, the use of household appliances is seven times the national average. Among Valley housewives, not only are electric radios, vacuum cleaners, toasters, irons, fans and heaters commonplace, but such items as electric stoves, dishwashers and washing machines, which in most other parts of the country are too expensive because of the cost of current.

Into the subject of comparative rates for public and private power I do not propose to enter. The private-utility companies have spent fortunes on printers' ink to try to prove that the TVA keeps its books unfairly, and is able to sell power at prices with which "unsubsidized" business is unable to compete. The TVA directors, on the other hand, believe that they make allowances in their financial set-up for every legitimate expense which business must meet, including local, state and federal taxes. Having spent many weary hours reading both sides of this controversy, it is my judgment that the TVA is right. In any case, private companies are competing nearby and are making more money than ever, even though they have reduced their rates drastically since TVA came into existence. At present, TVA and various private companies form part of one vast pool of power which covers the whole eastern part of the Mississippi Valley from Canada to the Gulf. Both TVA and private companies contribute power to the pool, or draw from it, according to their necessities of the moment.

An important use of this new, cheap electricity in the TVA has been the development of hundreds of small factories and cottage industries throughout the whole region. As an example: in the research laboratories of the TVA, engineers developed new and efficient types of deep-freeze equipment. In the Valley were many strawberry growers who were losing their market because their fruit was irregular in quality and deteriorated on its way to the consumer. The agricultural experts taught the strawberry growers to maintain high standards of quality; and the deep-freeze men showed them how to prepare their product for market so that deterioration was avoided. The result is that a group of men who were on the edge of bankruptcy have been aided in developing a prosperous enterprise.

Electric power, plus other assistance from TVA authorities, has also resulted in the development of a flourishing dairy industry. Chickens are also raised, with careful attention to size and quality, killed, put through the deep-freeze process, and then sold all over the world. Many other dairy and truck-garden products are either being raised for the first time, or are now available in better quantities and qualities and selling for higher prices, than ever before. Among the small local enterprises that have come into existence or greatly expanded, because of the TVA, are cheese factories, flour mills, lumber yards, shipyards and plants for processing cottonseed and its by-products.

Of course, the advent of industry to a poverty-stricken rural region does not bring any sort of automatic millennium. Factory wages in the Valley as a whole are still below the level reached in highly industrialized areas like New England. Many small manufacturers retain their old prejudice against trade unions and subject Negroes to economic and social discrimination. On the other hand, the Authority itself is a model in both these respects. Trade union leaders in the Valley with whom I talked expressed themselves as entirely satisfied with the treatment received by the many thousands of men who have worked on various Authority projects. The TVA is scrupulous in avoiding wage discrimination between Negroes and whites whom it employs. My offhand guess would be that while the position of the Negro in the Tennessee Valley leaves much to be desired, it is better, and is improving more rapidly, than in the South as a whole.

As for what the coming of the TVA has meant to the people of the Valley, a few statistics help tell the story. From the beginning of the Authority in 1933 to 1939, which may be considered the last prewar year, wages paid in the country as a whole went up 46 percent, and in the Tennessee Valley 56 percent. Income of the total country increased 29.4 percent, of the Tennessee Valley 38.9 percent. The number of workers in the country increased 30 percent, in the Tennessee Valley, 40; retail sales for the whole country were up 54 percent and for the Valley, 67. These figures must be read with the memory that before the coming of the Authority, the entire Valley was a "depressed area" with income and employment substantially below the national average.

What the TVA has done to fight soil erosion and bring increased wealth to the land is an exciting story, which I shall tell in my next article. BRUCE BLIVEN

This is the first of three articles. The second will appear in an early issue. – THE EDITORS

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Science and War in Britain

ANY ATTEMPT to describe the effects of the war on British science, and the advances in scientific knowledge which have been made during the war, is liable to degenerate into a mere catalogue of what seem to be isolated pieces of discovery. What is more, it is necessarily an incomplete catalogue, since many of the inventions and discoveries of military importance are still secret, and are likely to remain so for some time to come.

The alternative approach is to attempt to give a general sketch of the situation in which the details are blurred or omitted, but in which the general play of light and shade is correct, and in which the advances likely to be of greatest significance for the future are put in the foreground.

There are some investigations of first-class importance which have already received considerable publicity. The American press has already reported British coöperation on the atomic bomb. Two other projects—the discovery of the anti-bacterial properties of penicillin and the development of radio-location, or radar—were initiated in Britain, largely as the result of research programs extending over many years, but their subsequent development on a large scale has taken place in the United States. This has been due partly to the fact that much of Britain's war has been fought over her own soil, and attack from the air and the threat of invasion over the narrow seas made it advisable to remove a good deal of the work out of the immediate danger zone. A second, and very important, reason is that scientific research, and more especially what is called "development research"—the research needed to transform a laboratory process into a large-scale industrial process—has always been much better financed in the United States than in Britain.

Thus it came about that while the anti-bacterial properties of penicillin were discovered and exploited in Britain as one step in a long chain of research on substances which would destroy particular kinds of bacteria without killing their human or animal host (chemotherapy), the great industrial experience of fermentation processes which was available in the United States led to a far larger and more rapid development of commercial production in that country. Again, radio-location, so it is understood, derived initially from research on the location of thunderstorms, but the superior technical development of the radio, and particularly of the television industries, in the United States allowed American scientists to gain a considerable lead.

Instances such as these have caused a certain amount of criticism of our scientific organization in Britain, and the subject has been discussed, not only in the British House of Commons, but by a large number of organizations and institutions concerned with social studies of various kinds. Nothing which has been said is intended to belittle the extremely important part which the United States has played in these developments, nor is it intended to suggest that British scientists point the way for Americans to follow. Nothing would be further from the truth, and indeed the scientific collaboration between the two allies, a collaboration in which important advances have been made by both, has been happy and mutually profitable. The lesson which British scientists and politicians draw from these examples is not that more development research is needed in Britain in order to compete with other nations, but that through a relative neglect of it (we have, for example, no institutions comparable to the California Institute of Technology or the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) we find ourselves in a position where we have not enough to meet our own needs at home.

The war has therefore had the effect of hastening the development of industrial research in Britain, although even now we have not reached the necessary level in this department of science. The reverse of the medal is that fundamental research—the discovery of new facts and laws of nature which may later be of practical application—has effectively ceased for the past five years, and we have therefore fallen at least two or three years behind the United States in this respect. Fundamental research is of vital importance to scientific development. Without it, the edifice is merely erected higher and higher on the same foundations. The structure lacks breadth and flexibility and eventual top-heaviness leads to the kind of concentration on mechanical tricks such as we have seen during the war in Nazi Germany.

But, although the war has held up our scientific development in one way, it has stimulated our scientists in another. One of the leading characteristics of science before the war was its increasing tendency toward specialization. New lines of advance were driven independently and seemed to have no relation to one another. During the war, the problems which had to be solved were not those of the text-book subjects neatly divided into "physics," "chemistry," "zoölogy" and so on. They were broad problems of real life: problems of the effect of bursting projectiles involved not only the ballistics experts and the armor experts, but also the physiologists whose task it was to study the effect of protective measures on the human beings whom they were intended to protect. The problems of oxygen supply to air-crews involved not only the medical men, but spectroscopists, physicists and mathematicians as well. Other problems brought statisticians, physicists

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or biologists into fields which they had never entered before, and created new branches of study whose fringes only had been crossed by any kind of scientist before. The war has in fact led to the development on a considerable scale of what is called team research. The old story-book notion of the individual scientist working on a single problem in isolation has disappeared, and has been replaced by the concept of a team of research workers who, in many cases, have been trained in different disciplines, and collaborate by the contribution by each of them of his own specialized knowledge of a complex problem. There is good reason for believing that this trend away from specialization will become a permanent feature of British science, for those who, during the war, have worked under these conditions, have found their outlook broadened, and their capacity for original work increased by these contacts with sciences other than their own.

In the same way research has been undertaken on subjects lying on the frontier of two existing sciences. One example is provided by the work which has been undertaken by physicists in the application of their specialized physical knowledge to medical war problems. Not only has this included the better design of measuring and manipulative instruments for clinical use, such as, for example, the design of apparatus for the measurement of blood pressure, but has also included theoretical studies, such as the mechanical effects of impacts and injuries on the tissues of the brain, and the measurement and computation of the dosages of infra-red radiation which is widely used in the treatment of shock and disease.

Many of the wide problems of the employment of various techniques, such as the administration of oxygen cited above, are, during wartime, concerned with improvement in efficiency of operation of weapons and other military devices. This leads us to a whole new field of activity developed during the war, which has the additional importance of suggesting great new possibilities for the employment of scientific knowledge in the service of the ordinary man. Broadly speaking, this concept is that of fitting the product to the consumer, and includes such problems as the proper design of aircraft, particularly the placing and lighting of instrument panels, of the proper design of gun controls, and so on, all with the object of designing the weapon to fit the man who is to use it. On top of this, attention has been paid to the problems of the most efficient employment of weapons and groups of weapons so as to produce the most effective result. Little information has been made public on these matters, but, for example, it is understood that such matters as the formation of aircraft, their bomb loads and so on, are all the subject of scientific scrutiny. In present practice there is nothing specifically British about this, but the concept of operational research owes much to British scientists and dates from the early days of the war, when scientists were brought into close contact with the operational work of the services. This took place in connection with the early radio-location equipment, which at that time had not been fully developed and had to be placed under the care of experts straight from the laboratory. The application of this same technique of investigation to the products intended for industrial and household use would be of immense importance.

This brief survey has done far less than justice to many developments of science in Britain which have taken place during the war, but these general trends of a revolt from specialization, the growth of team research and a fostering of development research, while the importance of fundamental research continues to be recognized, seem likely to have a permanent effect on postwar development. These factors have had an effect on the outlook of scientists of all ages and conditions. Their outlook has been broadened: they recognize much more their place as technical members of the community, and reject the isolation of the traditional ivory tower. They ask too for a scientific approach to science, that is, for a previous analysis of the problems which need solving, and of some sort of preliminary agreement to secure that the essential problems do get solved. This tendency has been crystallized in the phrase "the planning of science" by which is understood, not an external regimentation, but a free coördination of activity so that both pure science and applied science shall be able to march ahead as rapidly as possible and shall give the greatest benefit to the community of mankind to which scientists belong.

London DAVID S. EVANS

Getting Out of the Army

STATEMENTS BY military and civil authorities on release of men from the Services seem to indicate that they were caught flat-footed by early termination of hostilities. Possibly lulled to sleep by high-ranking brass with its belief in another year of the war with Japan, the point system, a selective method of discharge, was the only working mechanism on hand when victory was announced. Complicated to handle, full of inconsistencies, it will not do when mass demobilization is undertaken.

Several factors account for the indecision of the Administration and the War and Navy Departments in laying out plans for demobilization. First, the war is technically not over, there may yet be fighting in outlying sectors, unrest in Japan, civil war in China. Second, no over-all statement of manpower needs, with reasons, seems to be ready and applicable to our occupation problems. Third, there is undoubtedly a pressure and resistance among the military to keep a big machine handy; the constant drumming up of rumors of war with some other power must emanate from high-rank-

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ing officers as well as the native nationalists and Soviet haters. Fourth, there is an apparent fear on the part of business and the administration that a great volume of veterans cast out on the reconversion scene now would only add to the unemployment rolls and lead to drastic demands, and might unite veterans with important sectors of the labor movement in urging large-scale government assistance, and possibly operation of some government war plants for civilian production.

The first question will soon be resolved, dependent on the good faith of the Emperor of Japan and his generals, and their ability to control outlying forces. Any unrest in Japan can be taken care of by relatively minor forces under MacArthur. And the question of civil strife in China depends largely on political decisions by the Big Three.

More important is the fact that guesswork has been used to determine the number of men really needed for an occupation army. Are we to accept General MacArthur's word that he requires 1,500,000 men, or are we to have a breakdown of the figures and substantiation of the need by Congressional investigation? If the Navy needs one million men, and another 500,000 are needed by the Army for occupation of Europe, the total comes close to three million. So far, no reasonably good peacetime method has been proposed for getting this number. But, supposing the Services need this many, how could they be obtained easily and fairly, while dischargees pour out of separation centers?

As for the Army: it has started recruitment of 500,000 men for three year enlistments, as part of the regular Army, and offers certain inducements. If the total of inductions for the year just preceding President Truman's memorable announcement of Japan's defeat was one million men, there should be 800,000 low-point men available for overseas service. Additionally, the new Selective Service quota of 50,000 inductees a month should bring in at least 480,000 more effective troops during the coming year. Add to these the pre-war regular Army men who will choose to stay in, plus the 100,000 or so officers needed, and the grand total of available men is around two million.

It must be remembered, however, that a great number of married men with dependents came into the Army around the time of the Battle of the Bulge, and to consider them as available to be shipped overseas now might involve unnecessary hardship. But judging by the above calculations, the Army could conceivably discharge every man in the Army who has had a year or more of service. It could get even more volunteers by granting pay raises or jumps in grade, and committing itself on overseas shipment of the families of regular Army men.

The Navy, already acting swiftly on the civilian front with cancellation of material and construction contracts, may be expected to clarify its policies on personnel shortly following the proclamation of official V-J day. With much to offer to permanent enlistees and officers, it should have no trouble obtaining the number it requires in the tapering-off period ahead.

Drumbeating, presumably, will find little support in Congress. That body may be expected to move quickly to show the military who is boss in peacetime; eyes on the votes of servicemen and their families will no doubt bring a growing demand for quick liquidation of all but the essentials of the present colossus. Benefit payments to families come high, but are not enough to encourage family men to stay in. And the man who has been in a long time and single—well, he has objectives of his own.

On employment opportunities: this may be the crux of the reason for delay in mustering men out. Here is where such measures as the Full Employment bill are starters, which cannot long be delayed. Congress must decide on a program with a positive character which will prove to servicemen that the war has not been fought for breadlines and despair.

Merely giving a green light and blow-torch to business will not be enough to provide all the jobs right away, and possibly not for some time to come. And with civilians on the move without restrictions to obtain the first openings, red-tape-tied soldiers may find the pickings quite bare a year from now. One means to avoid this might be to establish a formula setting up quotas on percentages of jobs which would be open to dischargees; perhaps this could be tied into the discharge system so that a man eligible for his discharge and promised employment could be released sooner.

At least part of the difference between available jobs and total workers could then be made up by a combination of needed public works and even direct temporary operation and conversion of RFC-owned equipment and plants by the government, with an eye to providing needed goods to our war-torn Allies. Subsequently, if feasible, private entrepreneurs could be invited to take over the operations, or the wartime principle of private operation on lease, with guarantees against losses, might work. Such a program could be undertaken at such plants as Geneva Steel, in Utah, some of the ordnance plants, shipyards, aircraft factories and materials plants.

In any event, it seems clear that our advanced technology would enable "business as usual" to produce a greater volume of goods than in 1940 with fewer workers, so some program of spreading opportunity, including stimulation of small enterprises, increased wages, shorter hours, guarantees against discrimination in employment, extension of the service industries and development of our international trade must be begun. Whatever the program is, it must shorten by months the time outlined by the President as required for demobilization. The average GI will say, just turn me loose, all I want is that White Piece of Paper. The only really great war industry in action today is that of the enlisted men dreaming up schemes to get out of the Army and Navy in a hurry.

ARTHUR EATON

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Washington Notes

Preview on Full Employment

LEND-LEASE was ended last week by President Truman with little fanfare. Yet it was one of the great instruments of the war and is one of the great monuments to the memory of Franklin D. Roosevelt. His critics never failed to scoff at it, but the whole world knew that it was the foundation upon which the victorious coalition was built. It will long live as one of the brightest pages in American history.

Hearings on the Murray-Wagner full-employment bill got off to a slow start, with the first half-dozen witnesses using up their time to make a case against unemployment and depression. They seldom mentioned the bill under study, and only a few of them would commit themselves on it. But after the first couple of days interest picked up. Support from the bill came from five business and financial spokesmen—Beardsley Ruml, chairman of the New York Federal Reserve Bank and treasurer of R. H. Macy; James P. Warburg; F. R. Von Windegger, president of the Plaza Bank of St. Louis; Harry Schacter, president of the Kentucky Merchants' Federation, and Clarence Avildsen, head of the Republic Drill and Die Company in Chicago. The most interested committee member turned out to be Senator Charles W. Tobey, the New Hampshire Republican, an enthusiastic supporter of the measure, although he conceded that some of his GOP colleagues thought he was moving to the Left.

As the hearings have developed, it has become apparent that the opposition is confused. Republican Senators Austin and Hickenlooper have been the only critical interrogators in the absence of Senator Taft. Neither Austin nor Hickenlooper will say how he stands on the bill, but each has been stabbing at witnesses in search of a weak spot. Austin finally wanted to know if the word "assure" was necessary in the directive to the government to assure full employment. The critics want to substitute some milder word like "encourage" or "promote."

Supporters of the bill, particularly James G. Patton, president of the National Farmers' Union, have pointed to its weaknesses, or rather to its limitations. They do not believe that it goes far enough to assure full employment; they think that the most it does is to assure debate in Congress on the problems of full employment.

Some of its journalistic supporters have described it almost as a cure-all, which of course it is not. But it is one test of the interest of Congress and of the people in the biggest domestic problem of this generation. The prospects are that the Senate Banking and Currency Committee will report it favorably and that floor debate will begin sometime after the middle of September.

Harry Truman is still having a hard time realizing that he is President of the United States. He has always been an easy-going, blunt-spoken individual, and it is hard for him to understand why every word he utters is worth a headline or a political fight. Several times since he has been in the White House he has answered press-conference questions too quickly for his own good. More than once he has had to correct himself later. It was unfortunate, for example, that in his first press conference after the Japanese surrender he remarked, rather facetiously, that the ban on politics was lifted. The GOP took up the challenge and tried to make something out of it.

Mr. Truman never meant it as a challenge. It is to his advantage to keep the lid on as long as possible. The remark was an unimportant interpolation in an answer to a question of an entirely different nature. Yet there was the President of the United States saying that the wartime imposition against all-out politics was ended.

Despite such errors, Mr. Truman's press conferences to date have been of a very high order. His answers are pithy, to the point and honest. He has not evaded delicate questions. Sometimes he fails to elaborate sufficiently to give a full explanation of his position, but few reporters have gone away grumbling.

When President Roosevelt answered a question, he usually spoke for several minutes and often told a parable—a Roosevelt parable. But President Truman's answers are seldom longer than one sentence. It is fascinating to compare the transcript of a Roosevelt press conference with one of Truman's. Truman frequently answers a score or more questions; Roosevelt seldom went over a half-dozen.

The recent terrifying article in the *Saturday Evening Post* called "The GI's Reject Education" should arouse the American people to the colossal educational task that lies ahead. It said that 5,000,000 members of the armed forces—almost half—have not finished grammar school. Hundreds of thousands of others had their high-school and college careers interrupted—in most cases ended—by the war. Yet fewer than one percent of the discharged veterans are taking advantage of the GI Bill of Rights educational provisions.

Army officers interested in the problem think that a higher percentage will take advantage of the provisions in the future. They give two possible explanations for the fact that veterans to date have rejected education. First, many of those discharged are physical or mental cases. Second, the temptation to try to make money has been very great during wartime.

Dr. Vannevar Bush and others have told us what a terrible loss we have felt in the sciences because of the four-year gap in higher education. The draft has forced young men into uniform long before any technical education could be begun—and the question is, Will a man of 20 or 24 go back to school with the young people of 17 and 18?

Of all the battles that must be fought with vigor in the next few years, none is more pressing than the battle for better trained minds. Many of our elementary and high schools have lost their best teachers during the war. Salaries have remained low, and few people have been attracted by the teaching profession. The draft is still taking the 18-year-olds—interrupting the education of thousands of our most promising citizens. As a nation, we do not seem to be alive to the terrible losses we have suffered in the education of our people.

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Notes. – Only five of the ten members of the Senate Banking and Currency Subcommittee appointed to study the full-employment bill attended last week's hearings. . . . Congressmen won't have much legislation up for debate when they get back from their summer recess. But they will have plenty to talk about, and one thing uppermost in their minds will be the slowness with which the Army and the Navy are demobilizing.

Washington T. R. B.

The Hour of Charm

BRING ON the Girls" is a musical, in watery, acid Technicolor, starring Sonny Tufts, Eddie Bracken and Veronica Lake. It is probably the most undernourished, unrewarding expensive movie made in years. The story has to do with the search of a millionaire sailor for a girl who will marry him for love rather than for his money, and is extremely short on incident, action and originality. The movie is blown up to feature length with musical acts—called for even less than usual by the plot—and in all of them, in spite of a certain grace and prettiness of Marjorie Reynolds and a likable, good-hearted quality about Sonny Tufts, the mechanics are overpowering. This is the kind of musical whose songs are as characterless and indistinguishable from one another as whatever comes out of Muzak. The movie is a particularly unsatisfying, jerry-built affair, and I mention it because it is also a particularly crass, tasteless one. It contains more instances of human treachery, meanness, greed and sadism than any movie I've seen recently, all shown to no purpose.

The hero, or fall guy, is the trusting, unselfish, anxiously sincere, mild Sturges character, played again by Eddie Bracken, who is led through one unhappy experience after another because of his virtues and the lack of them in the people around him, and because of the fun that can be got out of spilling him constantly on his face. The sadistic treatment of the character here seems very unpleasant because he is taken lock, stock and barrel from the Sturges movies, and the humiliation of him from second to second seems an implacable, mechanical act; also, whereas in Sturges' movies the sadists seem horrible but important, in this movie they seem just trashy. The script soaks so long and thoroughly in deceit, cruelty and greed that you feel its writers and director are hypnotized by these qualities. This seems most the case when the script gets stuck, purposelessly and for a long time, on the act of one person paying off another for information, or, when in the midst of a silly musical act, you are shown the mildly comic but violently cruel action of two men knocking a boy into the ground by hitting him on the head with sledge hammers. Quite often, the writing of a comically intentioned scene will get sidetracked oddly into a straight, morbid cruelty. This happens during a monologue by a family servant (Alan Mowbray) who, thinking his master has gone deaf, reveals his savage hatred of the hero and the fact that he has put up with him only to fleece the family. The movie ends, after the hero has been taken by at least a regiment of people, with his falling in love, in about one second flat, with a girl as rich as himself; the conclusion being that nobody less rich would be interested in anything about him except his money.

Most of the bearable notes in the movie are struck by Eddie Bracken. He is able to show the sympathy, desire for love and the trust of a kind, meek person in an honestly innocent, believable way. Everything he does, from trying hurriedly to put on his pants to making a suggestion to an officer, is done in a luckless, unheroic, completely sincere fashion that is comic, touching and right for the character. The funniest moment in the movie, in which he tries to locate a nickel that has got misplaced in a fist-sized wad of bills, is due to the beautifully unselfconscious, straight-faced way he plays the scene. Sonny Tufts will be a good actor as well as a good singer of Crosby's type if he can ever give up his unrelenting use of heavy mannerisms. I don't know of any actress who would be less likely to show any trace of humanity in the role of a gold-digger than Veronica Lake. There is one scene that shows Miss Lake moving in on some sailors, in which each glance is monumental with cynicism that is particularly astonishing. Aside from this natural aptitude, her slipshod playing and what seems her total lack of interest are like an exposure of everything behind and in this movie. MANNY FARBER

The Bandwagon

I knew that when this socialistic nonsense of free concerts was started in Grant Park that it was just the start. Now they want trees and next they will want free refreshments during the concert. All at the taxpayers' expense, of course. I have nothing against trees, but I do think we should put a stop to this wild governmental spending which is bringing us to anarchy and socialism. – *From a letter to the Chicago* Sun.

From 1916 he [Harold Laski] was a lecturer at Harvard. As he calls himself a "professor of political science," you do not have to stretch your imagination very far to know what sort of alien-minded doctrines he pumped into the ears of young Harvardians. – *From an editorial in the New York* Mirror.

Too Much Peace in Our Time

The Archbishop of Canterbury, the Right Rev. Geoffrey F. Fisher, today expressed his fear that the real danger of the atomic bomb lay not in endless destruction but in the increased leisure it offered mankind. – *From the New York* Times.

War and the Working Class

Fancy Lace from the Soviet Union: Just arrived: latest handiwork as fine as the eye of a needle can produce; interesting to see what the peasants kept their minds on while their men fought for life and freedom. – *An advertisement in the Philadelphia* Inquirer.

That All-Out Effort

As the 85,000-ton *Queen Elizabeth* moved slowly into the slip of Pier 90, at the foot of West Fiftieth Street, a new note was added to the traditional welcoming routine by the film actress Marlene Dietrich, who stood at the upper level corner of the pier's "porch" and waved one of her shapely and widely viewed legs at the thousands of GI's packed at the rails. – *From the New York* Times.

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of the New Republic. *Please enclose the original clipping.* – THE EDITORS

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Correspondence

Potsdam Decisions on Germany

SIR: As an old and generally enthusiastic reader of the *New Republic*, I am more than a little astonished at the import of your editorial on the Potsdam decisions. Even if you accept the theory that the Germans have brought this on themselves, and that we are without blame or responsibility in the rise of Hitlerism and fascism, how can you accept with such equanimity a projected peace which makes the Versailles Treaty look like a joy-ride by comparison? The majority of liberals have always tended to consider Versailles as a contributing factor to the economic troubles of the inter-war period, and one of the underlying causes of World War II. The potentialities of the present proposals are far more sweeping but equally unmindful of the consequences for Europe as a whole.

Today, as Anne O'Hare McCormick says, "the second industrial country in the world is to be turned back into an agricultural country. The people with the highest living standard on the Continent are to be reduced to the lowest." This estimate, it seems to me, comes far nearer the truth than your contention that "only the purely war industries (*sic!*) are to be destroyed." The Potsdam communiqué says that all "unneeded" industrial capital equipment is available for removal as reparations, or may be destroyed. Who is to say what is "unneeded"? In Austria, it is reported by the New York *Times* correspondent, machines are being removed indiscriminately, and some "smashed with sledge hammers" or thrown out of windows. And Austria is merely a presumably unwilling satellite.

The Allies' avowed intention is to de-industrialize Germany to the point where she can produce only what the Big Three consider necessary for her, and to export only enough to pay for what *they* consider she needs. You say, rather smugly, that "this is a sensible policy for any nation,"—which might be true if the nation has the right to decide for itself, but not if that right rests with its greatest competitors. The fact is that the bombing of industrial cities has already reduced German production to a point where she would require outside help in order to become an industrial power again. Now that we have invented the atom bomb, German industry could be destroyed in a matter of days. Yet we still assert that we must de-industrialize Germany in order to keep her from starting the next war.

What we chose to ignore completely is (1) how the population of Germany, predicated on an industrial export economy, is to sustain life on a greatly reduced production level, and a territory reduced by 25 percent or even more; and (2) how Europe is to recover and prosper without the help of her greatest prewar source of production.

You may say that the annexation of German territory by Russia and Poland "makes necessary the expulsion of large German populations, overcrowds the remainder of German territory, and *may* [italics mine] give rise to a dangerous irredentism"—a masterpiece of understatement. Yet you suggest that the European economy is likely to expand, and boundaries "may become of little importance, no matter where they are." Are you looking ahead to the socialist millennium? In the past —and today—European economy has suffered from maldistribution—of raw materials, of industry, of manpower, skill and experience. What Potsdam proposes is a further dislocation, by creating a Poland with 25 million Poles on a territory larger than Germany with 65 million Germans, and an underpopulated France in the west.

You suggest that all proposals for the destruction of Germany as a nation have been rejected at Potsdam. "Destroying" nations by partition has been signally unsuccessful in the past (*vide* Poland). Yet it might have been better to dismember Germany than to emasculate her economy, and condemn her crowded people to poverty. A dismembered Germany might indeed have benefited a Europe in which "the economy and culture of Europe are to be dominant, rather than the economies and cultures of separate nations." But a Germany reduced to a huge slum, and dominated by three non-European powers can only be a source of infection to the rest. The Europe which the Big Three are creating is a Europe in which nationalism will rise to new temperatures, a Europe which will be a breeder of civil strife.

New York City CESAR SAERCHINGER

SIR: The *New Republic's* consistent wisdom and tolerance in regard to the German problem encourages me to question the confidence your editorial expresses in the "Potsdam Decisions." Do these decisions really "contribute to a durable and creative peace"? Do they offer a "hope of life, freedom and eventual participation in the comity of nations"?

In pronounced words, yes, in fact—? Your editorial even lends credence to the renewed pronouncement of the intention sternly to liquidate the Nazis and their institutions and promptly to punish the war criminals, although articles in the *New Republic* have repeatedly presented convincing evidence that good intentions by the Allies in this regard have not been followed by action. As to the other decisions, there may be hope for Germany, but it does not lie in the Potsdam decisions, but in their possible revision. Your editorial recognizes this in referring to the dismemberment of Eastern Germany. However, it is in this very matter that hope for revision is least justified. The New York *Times* was much more realistic, saying, in an August 10 editorial, that President Truman "leaves no doubt that this territorial change is permanent." Russian-Polish insistence on this point is one of the cornerstones of postwar strategy.

The loss of 40,000 square miles is not a simple territorial change, but the loss of a third of Germany's food supply and of one important industrial region of pre-Hitler Germany. It involves the deportation of a total of 14 million Germans (including 2.5 million Sudeten Germans), mostly farmers and laborers. It may be intended to handle further deportations "humanely," but the whole eastern German amputation will multiply the difficulties of all the other reconstruction problems. One way to balance the "territorial" loss would have been a drastic revision of the decision made at Yalta to de-industrialize over and above war destruction by removing nine-tenths of the heavy industries. But, while the Potsdam decisions speak timidly for the self-evident need of industrial facilities for the more than 60 million Germans crowded into Smaller Germany, there is no indication that the removal of essential industries will not continue. Indeed, the fact that the Big Three rejected reparations payments underlines a policy of further reduction of industrial potential. And this is the crux of the matter: hardly 10 to 12 million of the approximately 60 million surviving Germans will find work in German agriculture; another 10 million may be sent abroad to work, most of them under slave-labor conditions in the East—as the *Herald Tribune* reports—a point of which your editorial makes no mention at all; of about 40 million remaining, at least half formerly lived and found their livelihood in the now destroyed cities. We do not know

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how much of the consumption-goods industries have been destroyed or are obsolete, but there can be no doubt that in the new torso of Germany, the industrial potential for a long time will be much less than in the Weimar Republic. But it will have to create work for an industrial population that is relatively greater for the area, even after taking into account reduction through war losses and deportation abroad. The situation will naturally be aggravated by loss of merchant marine and civil aviation, by the loss of much of the only plentiful raw material—coal—and, of course, by the loss of all financial and moral credits. A further problem will be the costs of occupation. It is difficult to see how the intention stated at Potsdam of providing the German people with "the essentials of a decent life," can be realized under these conditions. Economically Potsdam is not only a death sentence for a war-making Germany; so far it does not offer a plan for peaceful reconstruction either.

It is also inconceivable how in the German slum the "encouragement of democracy" is to become "the cornerstone" of the structure. Let us be honest. The idea in some peoples' minds is to wipe out a competitor, not to create a democracy. The step to permit local self-government is an important revision, but not enough of a revision of the disastrous non-fraternization policy. Sixty million Germans, purged of their war criminals, their war-party more broken than ever before, might have found an adjustment under radical emergency measures, if granted real responsibility. But their self-government now will be limited to administering Allied decisions in all essential policies. Far away on the horizon is the promise of a German government. No, this is a colonial status. The way "to a wholesome settlement" is still closed.

Judged by the verdict on Japan, Potsdam clearly trusts the Japanese democratic potential more than the German. This is hardly justified, Japanese democratization being even more retarded than the German.

From the point of view of retribution, you can make a good argument for the Potsdam decisions, but not from the point of view of a creative peace, which I know is your real concern.

New York City PAUL HAGEN

[The difference between our correspondents and ourselves lies mainly in interpretation of the Potsdam decisions and predictions as to how they will be implemented. We do not wish to see Germany reduced to an agricultural slum, and do not believe that the German people can be given a decent life, as the Big Three promised at Potsdam, without a considerable industry, including some heavy industry. Of course it will be necessary for Germany to export manufactured goods in order to obtain imports required for a decent standard of living. In our opinion, the language of the Potsdam agreement allows scope for the desirable action. If the Allies do not permit it, we shall join our correspondents in disapproval of their policy.

Several specific points require comment. The removal of machinery in payment of reparations, however much hardship it may impose on the Germans for the present, is a matter of simple justice to the liberated countries. It is, moreover, a far wiser solution of the reparations problem for the long future than the provisions of Versailles. New and better machinery made to take its place wherever necessary will in the long run be of advantage to the Germans. We believe Mr. Hagen is completely unrealistic in calling for a national democratic German government with autonomy to decide economic policy during the period of occupation. It is this period which the terms specifically cover. The hope for an expanding economy is not a wish for a socialist millenium, but the only basis for peace and stability anywhere in the world. The victors can fail to create it only at their peril. If they do create it, they will regard the resuscitation of essential German industry not as trade rivals, but as statesmen concerned with producing abundance. We agree that the annexations to Poland create extremely serious problems and should be revised. – THE EDITORS]

Depression Scare

SIR: We are witnessing the creation of a synthetic depression, a curious spectacle. Both the Right and the Left seem intent on convincing the country that we are due to take a tremendous businessman's nosedive right now. This week a national newsletter opens with a statement that we are in the depths of depression now. The newspapers of the country announce that we will have 3½ million unemployed in a month, 7½ million in a year, and worse. Labor organizations are vociferous in announcing widespread unemployment. Business organizations speak dolefully of the number of men who will hit the streets. Government bureaus and departments vie with one another in producing statistics which grow more pessimistic by the hour.

Every group has its own reasons. The press of the Right joins with a group of manufacturers who want to use the present situation to drive wages down and break labor unions. The press of the Left joins with labor unions to demand prompt action, based on the pessimistic estimate, for increased unemployment compensation, the full-employment bill, and planning. The monopolists are trying to use the existing uncertainty to force the OPA to raise the ceilings on automobiles and other consumer goods, claiming that if this is not done they will not be able to give employment to more than 50 percent of their prewar staff.

All this commotion is going to pay off in panic. Already consumers with money in their pockets who would otherwise be seeking homes, washing machines, radios, and automobiles are tightening up and deciding to ride out the bad times which are being painted for them. Business men, particularly smaller business men, who have had plans for expansion largely to be paid for out of profitable operations are deciding to conserve their existing sound investments and forego risks. If this movement snowballs there will be real reason for unemployment.

At the present time there is no good reason for it. Manufacturers are very far along the road to peacetime reconversion, farther along than they ever cared to admit. For a long time they have been getting their peacetime production ready, even while they made war goods. For obvious reasons they didn't publicize what they were doing, for the public might not have responded too favorably to such a diversion from the war effort. Ford three weeks ago rolled a car off the Detroit line and ten days ago assembled one at Edgewater. The manufacturers generally are making 1942 models for which they have tools. They can make plenty of goods quickly and there is, even on a realistic evaluation of purchasing power, a tremendous backlog of needs which can be filled.

Manufacturers converted to war slowly and reluctantly. Reconversion to peace meets no opposition from them. On the contrary, the competitive market and the reckless abandonment of controls by the WPB is forcing a competitive situation which will drive any manufacturer into headlong pursuit of sales.

On this record there should be no widespread unemployment, until we hit the saturation point in the consumer goods market. Then, of course, all the evidence points to a terrific decline unless planning and legislative action, neither evident so far, come into being.

It makes not the least sense that 150,000 unemployed in New York, a city of 7 million, is played up as a major calamity, particularly when everyone knows that that part of these 150,000 who want to continue to work can replace unemployables and others who are holding down jobs in badly undermanned and incompetently staffed service industries. We shall be in the middle of a synthetic depression if for varied reasons all parts of the population go to town on the current theme of panic.

New York City ALFRED G. MARTIN

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Books in Review

Tolstoy: Husband and Writer

TIKHON POLNER's biographical study, *Tolstoy and His Wife*,[1] is a welcome book at the present time. For in the orgy of bad taste that is often called contemporary culture, the tendency toward the sensationalization and the fictionalization of biography is pronounced, and Polner's book can, by mere force of contrast, serve as a lesson. He was a pre-revolutionary Russian liberal, a provincial public figure, and he was acquainted with Leo Tolstoy and his wife, Countess Sonya Alexandra Tolstoy. His book was clearly a labor of love. It is marked by its modesty, its sympathy, and its objectivity. However, it does not pretend to have the definitive character that we find in the work of Aylmer Maude. Polner was widely read in the material available on Tolstoy's life, and he had read Tolstoy carefully and with a critical eye. He brought to his study of Tolstoy's life a knowledge of the material, and he handled this with tact and dignity. The fact that he focused this work on the marital relationship of the Tolstoys gives his book its special merit. For Tolstoy, undoubtedly the greatest realist of the nineteenth century, was also one of the most autobiographical, the most confessional writer of his times. His private life is intimately and integrally involved in his writings. Thus, by fixing attention on Tolstoy's married life, Polner helps us the more clearly to see how closely bound together are Tolstoy the man, and Tolstoy the writer.

Polner also contributes a compact and lucid account of the various changes of mind and attitude during Tolstoy's career; his summary of Tolstoy's writings—especially his work on religion—is excellent. Further, he quite aptly points out that Tolstoy's genius, his amazing empirical grasp of the material of direct experiences, and even his remarkable critical faculties, suffered no decline during the religious phases of his last years. Although Tolstoy the moralist may not appeal to as many readers as does Tolstoy the world literary genius, the same qualities and talents are exhibited in both his literary and moral writing. To have documented this fact is, in itself, of no little value.

Polner, in his account of the estrangement between Tolstoy and his wife, maintains an even balance. His sympathy for the two of them does not lead him vulgarly to take sides. He contrasts the standpoints of each, and refrains from blame, from unjust criticisms and from confusing his account by misleading personalization. In this respect, in particular, his handling of quotations from diaries, letters and other relevant sources is judicious, pertinent, and amazingly economical. His study is a relatively short one, and withal, one is decidedly impressed by the amount of data he has been able to pack into these 222 pages. The very compactness of the book is, in itself, attractive. The picture it presents of Tolstoy and his wife is clear, human, understandable. I do not think that there are any serious omissions in this picture with one possible exception. Polner's account of Tolstoy's flight from Yasnaya Polyana, his visit with his sister at a convent, his railroad trip, and his death in the house of a station master at Astapovo might have been more fully given. When Tolstoy lay dying, the Czarist government was hopeful of perpetrating a fraud on the Russian people by attempting to find means of giving out the impression that Tolstoy had made a death-bed return to the Orthodox faith. The Countess was required to remain outside of the house in the snows while her husband was in his last delirium, for fear that her presence would be disturbing. Despite this, despite all that had happened, despite the fact that she accepted the Orthodox faith, she was determined that this fraud not be put over. She saw to it that Tolstoy was buried as he had wished to be. These facts throw a sympathetic light on her character, and perhaps they might have been added to this study. But altogether, this book is to be highly recommended.

Tolstoy was a great ironist. But none of his irony matches some of the ironies to be seen in his own life. No novelist of the nineteenth century wrote more touchingly, more idyllically, with greater genuine feeling about family happiness than did he. In many of his accounts of family happiness, he drew on members of the Behrs family for material. Thus, he used some of the Behrs as partial prototypes for his rather Proustian early masterpiece, *Boyhood, Childhood, Youth*. This trilogy had become a tradition in the Behrs family. And then, he married eighteen-year-old Sonya Alexandra Behrs. He used her for his portrait of Kitty Levin in *Anna Karenina*, and some of his accounts of family happiness in that novel were based on his own early marital life. Similarly, Sonya's younger sister, Tatyana, was his model for Natasha Rostov. Again, the scenes of family happiness in *War and Peace* have, as one background, this same family. The gradual change in the relationship of Sonya and Tolstoy until it becomes an ambivalent one of love and hate, with their bitter quarrels, and their accounts of these quarrels in their respective diaries, is all tragically ironical.

Polner tells of these quite well. He recognizes that Tolstoy's later religious changes were implied in his early work. With this story set consecutively before us and kept in the center of our attention, one can, perhaps, grasp this more clearly. For instance, the scenes describing Natasha and Pierre in the epilogue of *War and Peace* can be seen as prophetic, once one has read this study. Natasha in these scenes is a scolding wife and mother, and Tolstoy even comments on how her interest has narrowed down to the performance of her household tasks. Here Tolstoy emphasizes one of his constant motifs—in life there are no happy endings. At the same time, we see Pierre as still restless, and we know that he is far from the end of his spiritual journey in life. He has accepted moral and religious ideas which are but a mere premise for the religious ideas that his author is going to develop in the future. The atmosphere

[1] Tolstoy and His Wife, by Tikhon Polner, translated from the Russian by Nicholas Wreden. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 222 pages. $2.75.

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of his household in these pages is somewhat suggestive of that which Polner describes in the Tolstoy household during the time when *War and Peace* was written, and in the period immediately after it was finished.

Polner indicates how Tolstoy gave expression to an intense feeling of guilt. This is important. Guilt—in fact a sense of class guilt—was one of the most powerful levers in the consciousness of Tolstoy. It was one of the central motivating factors which drove him to seek escape, escape from the values, the conventions, the privileges, the very way of life that was common to one of his class and his position in Russian society. If we would understand his many changes of mind, his successive adoption and abandonment of interests and enthusiasms, we must associate these with his sense of guilt. Like Pierre in *War and Peace*, he sought an occupation in life, an occupation which permitted him to harmonize ideals and actions. In this quest, he rejected, step by step, every value, every institution, every convention of Czarist society. And in the course of these rejections, Tolstoy clearly posed all of the major problems of his time, and condemned all of the major evils of Russian Czarist society. At the same time, he was a man of tremendous vigor, will and enthusiasm. He tried to think everything out to the end, and to live out his ideas.

When he was married, he flung himself into marital life with the same enthusiasm that he showed in undertaking all of his important activities. During the first days of his marriage, he was a very happy man. A relative wrote him during these days and asked for news of himself and Sonya. In his answer, he told her that there is no news of a happy man. He busied himself with the management of his estates, supervised the education of his children, and worked. In doing this, he helped to mould Sonya. She came to him, a girl of 18 who was intelligent, serious, honest. She was a conventional girl, and she became a conventional woman. Whereas Tolstoy, driven on to think and live every idea through, felt and expressed constantly an urgent need for change, she was content, satisfied to perform her role as wife and helper of a landowner and genius, and as the mother of his children. There were scenes, outbursts of jealousy and temperament, during the first period of their marriage, but there was no serious rupture. As long as Tolstoy remained the loving husband and father, the manager of his estates, the genius who was creating *War and Peace*, theirs was, on the whole, a very happy marriage. But then, a little later, when Tolstoy began to develop what was already implied in his work and his character, the rupture begins: little quarrels and differences, which were passed over before, now have more serious consequences. Scars begin to form on the corpus of this happy marriage. Sonya was bewildered. She was jealous by nature, and became intensely jealous of his "fads," his diversion of his energy from writing novels. When he wrote novels, she could even help him. For instance, she slaved making fresh copies of *War and Peace*: Tolstoy's handwriting was often so illegible that he could not always read it himself.

The Tolstoys were faithful to one another, and no outside love interests ruptured their marriage. Their disagreements, their differences flowed directly out of Tolstoy's need to change, to escape from his class with all of its conventions. A careful reading of Polner, as well as other biographies of Tolstoy, can easily confirm the conclusion that in his life as well as his work, Tolstoy tried to think out, to live out the problems of individualism in terms of the ideas and conditions of his times and his circumstances. The Russia of Tolstoy was a seething country, based on a contradictory social structure, and going from crisis to crisis. All this Tolstoy felt immediately and intimately. One of the institutions which inevitably feels the terrible weight of profound social contradictions in any society is the family. Tolstoy, more conscious, more self-honest, more articulate than almost all of his contemporaries, was more sensitive to the problems of the times than they. Tolstoy felt profoundly what others sensed only vaguely or even repressed from consciousness. The estrangement in his mar-

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riage, thus, is not to be seen as something merely personal, as based solely on a clash of temperaments. Like all else in the life and work of Tolstoy, it mirrors the life of his times. Here is a major source of Sonya's bewilderment. And to repeat, this is a conclusion which the material of Polner's book will help to confirm.

Tolstoy was more objective, more self-critical than his wife. But this superiority of his did not in the least help him to heal the troubles between them. He died seeking to escape. In his last delirium, he repeated, more than once: "Seek! Always seek! . . ." Whereas he was driven on in this quest, Sonya Alexandra almost cracked. She showed suicidal tendencies during the last period of his life, and in 1906, a doctor used the word paranoiac, in diagnosing her. Bewildered, tenacious, she fought to secure the future and the social position of her children. After his death, she said to Polner that although she had lived with him for 48 years, she "never really learned what kind of a man he was . . ." She became more calm when he was no more. And "Every day she walked to her husband's grave to decorate it with fresh flowers." This, one of the last pictures Polner gives of her, is touching, even tragic. For this was the period when the forces building up Russia were soon to unleash the most earthquaking revolution in modern history. It would settle pitilessly the question of security and social position for her children, and practically all of their social class. Seeing her sympathetically, touched by the image of her decorating Tolstoy's grave on the scene of happier days, the setting seems Chekovian. In the end Yasnaya Polyana seems like a *Cherry Orchard*.

JAMES T. FARRELL

Playwright as Pedagogue

The Use of the Drama, by Harley Granville-Barker. Princeton, N. J.: The Princeton University Press. 91 pages. $1.50.

NOW THAT the twentieth century is virtually half-over, we must temper our self-congratulation by admitting that its promised renaissance of English drama has turned out to be a false alarm. The Galsworthys and Barries, superseding the Robertsons and Pineros, have in due course been superseded by the Noel Cowards and Emlyn Williamses, and none of them has made an appreciable contribution to the repertory. Shaw, who at best has been a striking exception to prove a mediocre rule, has for many years been at his worst, reserving his comic antics for newspaper interviews and aiming his social satire at the income tax. O'Casey, the most vigorous talent to emerge from the Irish theater, has been no more comfortable in London than in Dublin; while the ablest of the Abbey players have gone Barry Fitzgerald's way to Hollywood. While Gordon Craig, in continental exile, has dreamed of unrealized—and perhaps unrealizable—productions, Shaftesbury Avenue has maintained a standard of highly polished stodginess from which other theatrical centers—even Broadway—might occasionally make refreshing departures.

The anticlimax is unpretentiously documented by this little volume, based on three lectures delivered at Princeton in 1944, just 40 years after the lecturer collaborated with William Archer in publishing schemes and estimates for a national theatre. If that earlier volume had paved the way for a dramatic revival, it would undoubtedly have been led by Harley Granville-Barker. But the estimates were overoptimistic; the schemes failed to materialize; and Granville-Barker, with the First World War, gave up his brilliant career as an actor-manager. Soon afterward, having given up playwriting too, he settled in France; more recently he has been living in this country. The theater's loss has been the library's gain, for nothing has done more than his practical insight to revivify Shakespearean studies during the past generation. Behind his inflection of a line or interpretation of a piece of business, as his listeners know even more authoritatively than his readers, stands the accumulated tradition of the British stage. It is good to learn that the Princeton University Press is bringing out an American edition of his *Prefaces to Shakespeare*.

Where the prefaces offer a play-by-play account of their subject, following each act, staging every scene, and walking through the leading parts, the present lectures incline toward chatty digression and casual generalization. But if they range over a variety of topics, they show a consistent line of argument; if there are not many new ideas, there is an important shift of emphasis. Although he glances back "Upon the Arts in General and their Fortunes in England," and looks ahead to "A Theater That Might Be," Granville-Barker's immediate concern is with "Drama in Education." Not with schools of the drama, which are something else again: an uneasy mingling, though he is too polite to use the words, of stage-struck amateurism and ham professionalism. Education, if it is to remain liberal, cannot forfeit its amateur standing: this was the issue between President Lowell and George Pierce Baker. Granville-Barker distinguishes two types of amateurs, however, the dabbler and the connoisseur. We cannot reasonably expect great playwrights, he reminds us, until audiences have been trained to appreciate them.

Thereby handing the whole problem over to teachers, he passes on a number of concrete and useful suggestions. He points out that a play is "a structure of mutual understanding" which can readily adapt itself to pedagogical purposes; that, by casting the roles among his students, the teacher can take apart in the classroom what the director puts together on the stage; that, in reversing the histrionic process, those elements which are synthesized by a rehearsal can be analyzed by a seminar. Thus the study of drama in its own terms provides a means of testing masterpieces, as well as training connoisseurs. In a broader sense, as an educational instrument, it can serve ulterior ends. It can help, if anything can, to sustain the integrity of the English language; it can lend the actuality of the present to significant episodes of past history; it can foster the complementary democratic virtues of self-expression and coöperation. It sets up a framework of human relationships which the film, conscious though Granville-Barker is of its technical achievements, cannot rival.

If his frequent allusions to democracy are tinged with a certain Churchillian condescension, it could be nostalgically argued that dramatists have seen better days under less popular regimes. Better to placate a noble patron than to flatter public taste, he suggests, but has that ever been the choice? Hasn't the public suffered as much as the dramatist from the contemporary adulation of the box-office? Haven't the taste of Michael Todd, the *noblesse oblige* of the brothers

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Shubert, the art-for-art's-sake of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer operated on a submarginal level of their own? Mr. Granville-Barker candidly admits that British censorship, the last of royal prerogatives, is quite as arbitrary as ours. Quality has been submerged by quantity in both countries, we may well agree with him, because dramatic art has been converted into show business. "The drama depends more upon organization than does any other art. Is it to be the only one left wholly to the higgling of the market?" The question is not less pointed today than it was in 1904.

Without marring a gracious occasion by such details of theatrical economy as must have amply crowded into his purview, Granville-Barker pushes home a familiar comparison. Admitted, since both must be fulfilled by performance, that the text of a play is like the score of a musical composition. Yet few actors or actresses attain a skill comparable to that which any musician must have before he ventures publicly to perform. And concert-goers would hardly stand for program after program of the unrelieved vulgarities and reiterated sentimentalities that playgoers supinely accept. More flourishing periods of drama have been able to depend upon convention: that is to say, upon a working collaboration between actor and spectator. Granville-Barker, though trained in the "implicit" school of Ibsen, has taught in the "explicit" school of Shakespeare; though taught to take nothing for granted, he has learned the meaning of symbols and the limitations of naturalism; accustomed to regard a play as a slice of life framed by a proscenium, he has come to recognize the value of audience-participation.

This, precisely, is where we come in, and where he appeals over the heads of producers to students. Drama has been known to spring out of unexpected places—even, to cite the most recent French example, out of Heidegger's metaphysics. Shakespeare, having survived puritan suppressions, Restoration "improvements," bowdlerized editions, and anti-Stratfordian theories, will weather the travesties of Miss Margaret Webster. At a time when the Bank of England is about to be nationalized, the British may revive their hopes for a national theater. Already the Old Vic, which began as a center for cockney melodrama, built up a rich Shakespearean repertory, and climaxed its public service by a gallant war record, has established strong claims to that position. It would indeed be anticlimactic if our American theater, having trooped across the globe to improvise performances before its most appreciative audiences, should relapse into the prewar provincialism of the New York stage. Even there, in the course of a particularly unimaginative season, it is the occasional play with an imaginative touch that has received the heartiest welcome.

Possibly Mr. Granville-Barker, like other humanists in wartime, apologizes too much; possibly his title is stamped with the date of its utilitarian stress. But if the reviewer may not impertinently refer to his own experience, an experience shared over a decade with several colleagues, it bears out the contentions of this book. A college dining hall is not the ideal auditorium, and a typical group of undergraduates is not the perfect cast; such productions would have no merit beyond the individual efforts that went into them, and the imagination with which they were eked out by benign friends and alumni, if Elizabethan comedies were less rarely produced. Many of the boys who swashbuckled their way through Falstaff's campaigns were fighting grimmer battles within the next few years. The part those extra-curricular rehearsals played in their lives, to judge from their letters, should not be overlooked in the current discussion of "general education." And, for those who remember that English drama did not achieve its full flowering until the University Wits joined the professional troupes, these considerations are not wholly academic.

HARRY LEVIN

Flying Tiger

Old Leatherface of the Flying Tigers: The Story of Claire Lee Chennault, by Keith Ayling. Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 274 pages. $2.50.

UNLESS THE TRAGEDY of a new Chinese civil war brings him back into the course of Far Eastern events, it seems likely that General Claire Lee Chennault is ready to assume his place in military history. A practical man, with a practical view of aerial warfare and not a great deal of nonsense about him, the celebrated ex-leader of the Flying Tigers and the Fourteenth Air Force already seems destined to become a figure of legend in both China and America. The deeds of his airmen have been indeed fabulous, his mastery of air tactics is unquestioned and the invaluable aid and loyalty he gave the Chinese cause in the darkest day of Occidental appeasement is one of the few things about that period on which Americans can look back with pride. On all these scores General Chennault deserves the admiration of his countrymen as well as of the Chinese, and it is fitting and inevitable that he should become the subject of an enthusiastic biography. It was possibly inevi-

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table, too, that the first of these biographies should be as routine as Ayling's *Old Leatherface of the Flying Tigers*.

Mr. Ayling tells the story of Chennault's career with sympathy, directness and a knowledge of the technical aspects of air tactics. From his book it is possible to get an adequate, if superficial, idea of the type of man his hero is and of the extent of his achievements. But it is frankly a job of hasty journalism and as such it suffers from the fact that it is unable to supply a proper answer to the journalistic questions that the recent rush of events in the Orient has brought up concerning its central figure. Since it was written, General Chennault has resigned from command of the Fourteenth Air Force after General Stratemeyer was placed over him, and loud cries have gone up in this country that the whole thing was the result of a conspiracy plotted by those curious bedfellows, the Chinese Reds and the U. S. Army brass hats. Mr. Ayling describes briefly the controversy between Chennault and General Stilwell and is clear about Chennault's disapproval of any criticism of the Chungking government, but he lets it go pretty much at that.

Thus time and the author's determination to be as noncontroversial as possible do tend to outmode his book. To one who watched the Stilwell-Chennault feud in wartime China, it was clear that, whatever the merits of the dispute, it had become so bitter and so intolerant that it was virtually a personal brawl that extended throughout the Army and made it impossible for any air officer to find the slightest touch of merit in ground operations while no officer of the ground forces could find a good word to say for aerial battle. Obviously such a violent feud had grave results in morale for both the Americans and the Chinese, while it was equally inevitable that the fight should be violent when carried on by men with such strong and colorful personalities as Stilwell and Chennault possess. I first saw Chennault in Kunming in the summer of 1939 when he was training Chinese fliers, and I must confess that he seemed to me just another retired soldier ending his days in rather weary fashion in the service of a foreign government. It was certainly a triumph of short-sightedness on my part, but I can no more deny it than I can deny that Stilwell has always seemed to me a far more engaging figure personally.

Although Stilwell, with his greater political sense, advocated coöperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist armies and Chennault seemed satisfied to leave everything in the hands of the Generalissimo, it is clear that Chinese internal politics played small part in the feud. It is equally clear that the recent resignation of General Chennault has no bearing on Chinese politics, as much as those of us who believe that a coalition government is the only way out of civil war in China would like to believe that it indicated the American Army had finally developed an intelligent political consciousness. Chennault is a brilliant individualist, a great aerial guerrilla leader and a man with a tremendous talent for air tactics and the management of an informal band of dashing air fighters. But he was hardly the man to fit in with the large-scale teamwork that would have been necessary in China had the Japanese war continued, and it is difficult to believe that he was the victim of an evil intrigue when General Wedemeyer placed another air-force general over him.

Among the great Chennault virtues is the capacity for attracting loyalty. It was a victory in this field when he held together such a band of wild men as composed the famous Flying Tigers, but he had an even greater triumph. Joseph W. Alsop, of the famous Washington columnist team of Alsop and Kintner, is not a man given to hero-worship, but as personal aide to General Chennault, he indulged in such worship of his chief that I shudder to think of the state he is in since his hero's resignation. Incidentally, Mr. Ayling brings up one fascinating point. Telling of a speech by the Generalissimo he says that "in ending he promised that the [Flying] Tigers would receive the same consideration in every respect as Chinese soldiers." Here was a threat that might well have made even the boldest of the American heroes blanch with fear.

RICHARD WATTS JR.

A Reader's List

PLANNING No. 237: Transatlantic Employment Outlook (Political and Economic Planning. Available through the *New Republic*, 25 cents). The great dilemma of American postwar economic policy, says PEP, will be the insistent need to sustain high-level production while politicians demand that state economic activity cease. Yet the responsibility for eliminating mass unemployment rests ultimately on Great Britain and the United States, for "booms and slumps originating in their economies spread to every corner of the trading world." How this task might be performed is analyzed with no little detail in this tersely written broadsheet. Reviewing various full-employment estimates, the editors conclude that America must increase her employment level after the war by at least 25 percent. Deferred consumer demand, inventory replacements and tax remissions will be advantageous postwar factors, yet they will at best have but a temporary influence. PEP asserts that Britain is more favorably placed; labor shifting will be less serious and postponed demand will be greater. But the basis of permanent prosperity—the high-consumption economy—must be a fundamental change in income distribution. The problem, the editors urge, requires a positive public policy, for "to ignore all experience, and gamble, in the name of free institutions, on the power of unplanned private enterprise to absorb total manpower in a modern industrial society, would be an act of irresponsible, doctrinaire recklessness."

Contributors

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PERCY WINNER, who recently returned to this country after fourteen years in Europe, calls himself a "depth journalist." He writes on psychological aspects of modern politics with special reference to the factor of mass irrationality.

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JAMES T. FARRELL's most recent book is *The League of Frightened Philistines*. At present he is completing the first volume of a trilogy, *Bernard Clare*.

HARRY LEVIN, an associate professor of English Literature at Harvard, has contributed an introduction to Flaubert's *Three Tales*, published last summer by New Directions.

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